Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 7
Number 1 Fall 1979

Article 4

1-1-1979

Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction--A
Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, the
Richard L. Rubin

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Rubin, Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction--A Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the, 7
Hastings Const. L.Q. 165 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol7/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE RIGHTPRIVILEGE DISTINCTION? A CRITICAL
LOOK AT MAIHER V. ROE AND
BORDENKIRCHER V. HAYES
By RichardL. Rubin*
If the option to pursue a certain course of conduct is considered to
be a constitutional right, it is axiomatic that the state may not, without
considerable justification, pass a law directly penalizing or preventing a
citizen from following that course. Hence, a state may not directly
abolish a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial,' nor may it, following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,2 impose a fine upon
a woman who obtains an abortion. A far more difficult question--one
which serves as the battleground for many of the controversial constitutional wars of the day-is the extent to which government may indireety burden a constitutional right. A law is said to indirectly burden
a right if it operates effectively to deny a desirable governmentally-provided privilege or benefit to an individual because that person has exercised a constitutional right. Two criteria have been developed to
evaluate the constitutionality of a law imposing such an indirect burden: first, whether the right has been so adversely affected that it may
be regarded as impinged upon by the law; and second, if there is actual
impingement, whether the law is necessary to achieve a legitimate and
a consticompelling state purpose. The desire to curtail the exercise of
3
tutional right is not a "compelling and legitimate" purpose.
This note deals with what the author perceives as a definite shift in
the Supreme Court's approach to direct and indirect burdens on constitutional rights, as reflected in two recent cases, Maher v. Roe4 and
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.5 In Maher the Court reviewed the propriety of
a state regulation which excluded non-therapeutic abortions from a
Medicaid program that subsidized pregnancy and childbirth expenses.
In Hayes the issue was whether a prosecutor could reindict a defendant
* B.A., 1974, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1979, Hastings College of the
Law, University of California. Member, California Bar.
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

3. See text accompanying notes 29-108 infra.
4. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
5. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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on a more severe charge for the express reason that the defendant refused to plead guilty to the present charge against him. These two
cases involved widely differing constitutional rights. The opinions in
those cases taken together, however, contain the latest significant pronouncements of the Court on the question of indirect burdens on
rights, for both deal with the question of the extent to which the government, while not acting to directly prevent the exercise of a constitutional right, may penalize or discriminate against a citizen for having
exercised that right. In both cases the Court seemed to move toward a
standard of impingement that looks less to the substantive impact upon
a right-whether the individual is deterred from exercising the right
and disadvantaged if he does exercise it-and more to whether the burden placed upon the right takes the form of a penalty. In both cases the
Court also indicated that a state policy could be justified by a governmental interest in having an individual forgo a constitutional right so
long as the policy's purpose was not to directly prevent or penalize the
exercise of the right.
The first part of this note examines the positions of the Court prior
to Maher and Hayes regarding indirect burdens on rights. These two
recent cases will then be analyzed in order to evaluate the new judicial
gloss placed upon the questions of what constitutes an impingement
upon a right, and what suffices as a legitimate countervailing state interest. Finally, the Court's new directions will be examined in terms of
their utility as tools of constitutional interpretation and their implications for social policy.
1.

Judicial Treatment of Unconstitutional Conditions Prior to
Maker v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes

In our modern interdependent society, there are many benefits that
federal, state and local governments provide to individuals or groups of
citizens which might be classified as "privileges" in that citizens possess
no unqualified right to receive them. Among these privileges, for example, are civil service jobs, welfare and unemployment benefits, the
use of public facilities such as parks and libraries, and admission to
public colleges and universities. While it is generally true that there is
no right to receive a privilege, and a government may, if it chooses,
distribute the privilege to no one at all, 6 constitutional questions are
6. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson, Mississippi, closed
all of its public swimming pools rather than operate them on a racially desegregated basis, as
would have been required under a federal district court decision mandating the integration
of the city's public facilities. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962). The
Supreme Court held that where the effect of a law was not discriminatory, the Court could
not examine the legislative motive behind the enactment. 403 U.S. at 225. Since the closing
of a swimming pool to everyone was found to be constitutionally benign, the Court needed
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raised by the manner in which the government chooses to distribute
those privileges it does bestow. For example, a city need not provide its
citizens with a public library. If the city does provide a library, however, it would be unconstitutional to limit its use to Baptists7 or to
Republicans' alone. On the other hand, a rule that would limit the use
of the library to county residents would very likely pass constitutional
muster. 9

Those prerequisites which the government attaches to the privileges it distributes are referred to as conditions. Thus, in the prior ex-

ample, the proposed requirements as to religion, political affiliation and
residency are all conditions. This note concerns those cases where the
government provides privileges contingent upon the recipient meeting
a so-called unconstitutionalcondition -- one which requires the recipito go no further. See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson.- An Approach to the Problem of Uncon.
stitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT.REV. 95.
7. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits
to Seventh Day Adventist because her religious beliefs precluded her from working on Saturdays).
8. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (political patronage dismissals); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (loyalty oath requirement for state employment).
9. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1975) (residency requirement for lower
tuition rate at state university).
10. A brief note as to terminology is in order at this point. Traditionally, commentators
have referred to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions: "Generally, the doctrine states
that while a government, state or federal, may not be obligated to provide its citizens with a
certain benefit or privilege, it may not grant the benefit or privilege on conditions requiring
the recipient in some manner to relinquish his constitutional rights. Furthermore, it cannot
withhold- or cancel the benefit as a price for the assertion of such rights." Note, Another
Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144, 144 (1968) (footnote omitted).
Thus, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is an approach courts have used (though
not by name) to invalidate what is referred to in the text as an "unconstitutional condition."
In order to provide a workable terminology, this note will refer to all conditions placed on
privileges or benefits which require the forgoing of rights as "unconstitutional conditions,"
regardless of the terms used by a particular court in its analysis. An unconstitutional condition may be held to be valid (e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (requirement that federal employees refrain from active
participation in partisan politics); accord,Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 368, 370-71 (1976)
(political patronage dismissals)), or invalid (e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967) (loyalty oath requirement for state employees); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh Day Adventist because her religious
beliefs precluded her from working on Saturdays)).
Use of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which involves striking down an
unconstitutional condition because it burdens a constitutional right (rather than because it
violates equal protection or due process), will be referred to in the text as an "indirect violation" approach. This language seems to comport with the terminology used by the courts.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403-04; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
For a general discussion of the unconstitutional condition problem, see Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in
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ent to forgo the exercise of a constitutional right in order to enjoy the
desired privilege. Thus, the requirements that library users be Baptists
or that they be Republicans would be unconstitutional conditions since
they would require an individual to forgo, respectively, the right of free
exercise of religion and the rights of free speech and association under
the First Amendment.
A.

The Right-Privilege Distinction

Early decisions dealing with unconstitutional conditions held that,
implicit within the state's right not to distribute a particular privilege at
all, was a lesser, unrestrained power to place conditions on a distributed privilege--even at the price of requiring an individual to forgo a
constitutional right."I The classic rendition of this position was by Justice Holmes in an 1892 Massachusetts Supreme Court case, McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford. 2 There, the court rejected a former policeman's contention that the city could not fire him from his job for disobeying a police regulation forbidding officers from taking part in
political activities. Holmes stated: "[T]here is nothing in the constitution. . . to prevent the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a
condition to the office of policeman. . . . The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman."' 3 Essentially, Holmes created this syllogism in McAuiffie:
there is no right to a governmentally-granted privilege; the power
not to grant. a privilege at all includes the lesser power to restrict or
reduce the grant; therefore, a privilege may be granted on any condition-including the waiver of a constitutional right.
Three years later, the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Davis 14 gave Holmes the opportunity to reaffirm the Mc.4uliffe principle."5
Davis, a preacher, was convicted of violating a Boston ordinance which
forbade "making a public address upon the public grounds without a
permit" issued by the mayor. Holmes concluded that the ordinance did
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]; Note,
UnconstitutionalConditions,73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968). See also Hale, UnconstitutionalConditionsand ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Oppenheim, Unconstitutional
Conditions and State Powers, 26 MICH. L. REV. 176 (1927).
11. "The right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the authority to
determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser."- Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). See also Van Alstyne,
supra note 10, at 1439-42; Note, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions,supra note 10.
12. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
13. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
14. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), afdsub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S.
43 (1897).
15. 162 Mass. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113.
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not violate rights of free speech, even though it allowed the mayor complete discretion in granting or refusing such permits:
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right
interferes, the Legislature may end the right of the public to enter
upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to pubthe lesser step of limiting the public use
lic uses. So it may 1take
6
to certain purposes.
The thrust of Holmes' analysis, which came to be known as the
"right-privilege distinction,"' 7 was to draw a constitutional line between rights, such as religious freedom and political advocacy, and
benefits granted by the government, such as civil service jobs and the
use of public parks. The latter, being mere privileges, were unamenable to constitutional safeguards. Thus, no constitutional right was
abridged when a citizen was denied, for any reason, a privilege provided by the government, even if the denial was precisely because the
individual chose to exercise a constitutional right. The application of
the right-privilege distinction logically entailed the validation of any
unconstitutional condition attached to a privilege or benefit.' 8
The right-privilege distinction remained a viable instrument of
constitutional interpretation until the late 1950s. 19 Its recitation alone
often sufficed to shut the door upon any claim that government had
wrongfully deprived a claimant of some government largess. 20 Thus, in
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,2 ' the Court unanimously rejected the claim of a group of Methodist university students
that they should be excused from mandatory R.O.T.C. training on the
basis of their religious beliefs. The Court indicated that while the Constitution guarantees the right to maintain and practice religious tenets,
this does not prevent a state from making military training a condition
for attending a public university and from excluding those who refuse
to participate, even if the non-participation is religiously motivated.22
Similarly, in Adler v. BoardofEducation,2 3 the Court upheld the constitutionality of New York's Feinberg Law, which made membership in
the Communist party a prima facie ground for dismissal of a public
16. Id.
17. Van Alstyne, suora note 10.
18. Id. at 1439-42; Note, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions,supra note 10.
19. See notes 29-43 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), ard by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
21. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
22. Id. at 262.
23. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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school teacher. The Court succinctly indicated that the law did not
infringe First Amendment rights:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. . . . It is equally
clear that they have no right to work for the State. . . on their
own terms. . . . If they do not choose to work on [terms set
down by the state], they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere.24
It is important to note that the right-privilege distinction was applied only to benefits provided substantially at state expense. Courts
utilized a different line of constitutional theory, namely substantive due
process, to closely scrutinize laws regulating privately-funded activities.2 5 Those laws tending to abridge named as well as unnamed constitutional rights were struck down. This is illustrated by Meyer v.
Nebraska26 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 where the Court admonished that the power of the state to regulate private education was subject to due process limitations. 8 A distinction between essentially
private activities in which rights were protected against abuses of government control, and publicly subsidized activities in which they were
24. Id. at 492.
25. Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 1442-44.
26. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer invalidated a state law prohibiting the teaching of a
foreign language in any school to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. This law was
held by the Court to violate the right of teachers "to teach and the right of parents... to
instruct their children." Id. at 400.
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce, relying on Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 390, held
unconstitutional a law which required public school attendance, thereby preventing children
from attending private schools instead.
28. "[R]ights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which
has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State." Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399-400. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535. It is
instructive to note the distinction made in Hamilton between that case and Meyer and
Pierce: "There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively to define what is included in the 'liberty' protected by the due process clause. Undoubtedly it does include the
right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which
these students base their objections to the order prescribing military training. The fact that
they are able to pay their way in this university but not in any other institution in California
is without significance upon any constitutional or other question here involved. California
has not drafted or called them to attend the university. They are seeking education offered
by the State and at the same time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course
solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and conscientious objections to war, preparation for war and military education. Taken on the basis of the facts alleged in the petition,
appellants' contentions amount to no more than an assertion that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' confers the right to be students in the
state university free from obligation to take military training as one of the conditions of
attendance.
Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at once be put aside as untenable." 293 U.S. at 262 (citations omitted).
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not, was necessary to prevent the right-privilege distinction from swallowing up all constitutional freedoms.
B. Indirect Violation of Right Analysis of Unconstitutional Conditions
Soon after 4der, the right-privilege distinction began to crumble;
it eventually fell. Beginning in 1952 with Wieman v. Updegraff,2 9 and
followed by Shelton v. Tucker3 ° and Sherbert v. Verner,3 ' the Warren
Court fashioned a response to Holmes' McA4ulffe syllogism. 32 The response was that while there is no right to a governmental privilege,
upon the waiver of a constitutional right vioconditioning the privilege 33
lates that particular right.
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,34 the petitioner, a Seventh Day
Adventist, was denied unemployment insurance benefits because she
refused, on religious grounds, to work on Saturdays. The unemployment board had held the petitioner's refusal to be a failure without
good cause to make herself available for work. The Supreme Court
ruled that the board's policy violated the petitioner's right to free exercise of religion. The Court squarely rejected the board's claim that
"unemployment compensation benefits are not [a] 'right' but . . . a
'privilege,' 3 and therefore not constitutionally protected: "It is too
late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may
be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege."'36 The Court found that the board's policy placed "the same
kind" of burden upon the petitioner's free exercise of her religion as
would a fine imposed on Saturday worship. 37 Such an infringement
upon freedom of religion, said the Court, could be justified only by a
compelling state interest. 38 Since no such interest was shown, the policy was found to be unconstitutional.3 9
Five years later, in Keyishian v. Boardof Regents,40 the Court, in a
five to four decision, struck what was probably the death blow to the
right-privilege distinction. Reexamining New York's Feinberg Law, it
29. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
30. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

32. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
33. Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 1445-46; Note, Another Look at UnconstitutionalCon-

ditions, supra note 10, at 144. This doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has roots extending further back than the Warren Court era. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926).
34. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35. Id. at 404.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 406.
39. Id. at 407.
40. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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found the law to be unconstitutional, thus effectively overruling Adler.
Under case law prior to Keyishian, a citizen's membership in the Communist Party was found to be constitutionally protected, so long as
membership was not coupled with a specific intent to further an unlawful end.4

Therefore, held the Court, New York's law making Party

membership alone an absolute bar to the privilege of teaching burdened both protected and unprotected conduct.42 Since the state could,
through a more narrowly drafted statute, achieve the legitimate end of

barring those Communists who intended illegal acts without burdening
protected First Amendment conduct, the Feinberg Law was held overbroad and thus unconstitutional.4 3
The key to the Court's shift from decisions like Hamilton and Adler to those such as Sherbert and Keyishian was the equation of an

indirect burden 44 upon a freedom, in the form of an unconstitutional

condition, with a direct sanction placed upon the exercise of a constitutional right.4 5 In order to justify placing an indirect burden upon a
right, the Court held that the state must demonstrate the same strong or

"compelling" interest necessary to justify a direct burden upon that

right.4 6 This indirect violation of right doctrine has been applied most
often in cases involving freedoms of speech and religion.4 7 But it has
been used in other types of cases as well.
For example, in United States v. Jackson,48 the doctrine was ap-

plied by the Court in striking down a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act concerning the death penalty. Under the statute, capital
punishment could be imposed only "if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend. . . 2 9 This had the practical effect of exposing to the
risk of a capital verdict solely those defendants who elected a jury trial.
41. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 228-29 (1961). The Adler Court did not dispute the petitioners' right to be Communists,
but held that this right did not prevent the state from dismissing them from their jobs for
exercising the right. 342 U.S. at 492.
42. 385 U.S. at 599-600, 609.
43. Id. at 609-10.
44. Strictly speaking, a non-direct burden upon a right may occasionally exist other
than where a condition is placed upon a privilege. See, e.g., White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,
767, 533 P.2d 222, 228-29, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 101 (1975) (police discouraging the exercise of
First Amendment rights by use of informants on a university campus). Such burdens are
beyond the scope of this note.
45. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 605-06; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at
404.
46. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 338-39 (1972).
47. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions,supra note 10, at 152.
48. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1964). The statute was amended in 1972 to remove the
death penalty provision.
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The statute provided no procedure for imposing a death sentence on a
defendant who pleaded guilty or was tried before a judge. The Court
held that this scheme constituted an invalid unconstitutional condition
which infringed upon the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to plead
not guilty and Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. The law
needlessly deterred and penalized the exercise of these rights by conditioning the benefit of a non-capital sentence upon waiver of a jury
trial." The Court also indicated that any purported interest of the government in discouraging defendants seeking jury trials would not be
recognized as legitimate.5" Nor did the Court accept the argument that
the measure be seen as an effort to mitigate the severity of the death
penalty with "the incidental effect" of inducing defendants not to demand jury trials. 2
Jackson taken together with cases such as Key/shian and Sherbert
suggest a distinct two-step approach to evaluating an unconstitutional
condition as an indirect violation of a right. First, the court must determine whether the right is actually impinged upon by the law. If it is,
the court must find a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the
impingement before the law will be upheld.
The threshold question is whether the challenged law so adversely
affects a right as to burden or impinge upon it. The Supreme Court has
used two tests to determine whether a right is burdened: (1) does the
law discourage the exercise of a constitutional right?,5 3 and (2) if an
individual does exercise the right, does the law impose a detriment
upon him for doing so?5 4 Any state policy meeting one of these standards will likely meet the other, and the Court seems to discuss the two
almost interchangeably.5
Assuming that the questioned policy is found to impinge upon a
right, the next issue is whether there is a state interest which justifies
such a burden. Although the language in various cases is not always
consistent, there seem to be three basic requirements which must be
met before a law found to burden a right will pass constitutional muster. First, the governmental interest behind the law must be a legiti50. 390 U.S. at 582-83.
51. "If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently
unconstitutional." Id. at 581.
52. "The question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary [to the achievement of a legitimate
state end] and therefore excessive." Id. at 582.
53. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. at 604, 609; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404-05.
54. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-83; Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. at 607; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406.
55. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,581; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 405-
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mate end of government. Under this requirement, the purpose of the

law must not be merely to discourage the exercise of constitutional
rights.16 Second, the state interest must be compelling. 7 Finally, assuming such an interest is present, the burden imposed upon the right
must be necessary to achieve that end. There must be no alternative
which would achieve the legitimate purpose without burdening the

right more than is necessary in
right.5 8 Nor may the law burden the
59

order to accomplish the desired end.
The indirect violation of right approach thus provided protection
against governmental imposition of unconstitutional conditions, protection that had been denied by the right-privilege distinction. In sub-

sequent cases, the Court developed, through application of the due
process and equal protection clauses, two other approaches that similarly limited the state's power to provide privileges in such a way as to
discriminate against citizens exercising rights.
C. Due Process
In North Carolina v. Pearce,6" the Supreme Court used the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a perceived unconstitutional condition which penalized the exercise of a
state-created right. The question in Pearce was whether a criminal de-

fendant who had successfully attacked his first conviction by appeal
could be given a longer sentence by a judge upon his reconviction for
the same offense in a second trial. The Court held that while there was
no federal constitutional right to an appeal, if a state did in fact grant

such a right, it would be a violation of due process to penalize a de56. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
411 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
57. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406. Later cases indicate that the compelling state
interest test is always appropriate in indirect burden cases. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 338-39 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Reliance upon this test
has not provided an absolute bar to government privileges conditioned on a waiver of rights.
In United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973), the Court upheld the Hatch Act's restrictions on the political activities of federal
employees. The Court apparently used the compelling state interest test, even though it did
not expressly state the applicable standard: "Such decision on our part would no more than
confirm the judgment of history, a judgment made by this country over the last century that
it is in the best interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend
upon meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence
of federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited." Id. at 557
(emphasis added). It should be noted that an interest in avoiding political civil service entanglement is legitimate, and is distinguishable from a mere desire to suppress speech or
political association. See note 56 supra.
58. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
407.
59. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 608-10.
60. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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fendant who chose to exercise that right. 6 ' Thus, the state could not
condition the privilege of receiving a less-than-maximum62 prison sentence upon the waiver of a state-created right of appeal.
Although the Court in Pearce stopped short of holding that a second sentence after retrial could never be greater than the defendant's
original sentence, it held that the state was prohibited from passing an
increased sentence based on "vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction .. ."63 The Court
further restricted the ability of a judge to impose a more severe sentence after retrial, even where provable vindictiveness is absent:
[S]ince the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally
attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation
on the part of the sentencing judge.
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation . . .
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant
64 occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.
An indirect violation approach such as that utilized in Jackson
was inappropriate in Pearce since there is no federal constitutional
right to appeal a criminal conviction.65 Nevertheless, by holding that a
state violates due process by penalizing the exercise of its own statecreated right of appeal, the net analysis is essentially the same as that in
Jackson. The power of the state to impose a higher sentence upon a
reconvicted defendant is circumscribed by the due process clause because the unchecked freedom of the state to use this power vindictively
would serve to penalize and deter the exercise of the state-provided
right of appeal. It might just as well be said, in indirect violation terms,
that this power impinges the right to appeal (by detering and penalizing
the state interest
it), and its exercise must be limited to instances where
66
in a higher sentence is legitimate and compelling.
While any purported interest of the state in discouraging and penalizing criminal appeals is not legitimate, the interest of the state in
61. 395 U.S. at 723-24.
62. Id. For discussions of unconstitutional condition theory in the criminal justice system, see Van Alstyne, In Gideon'sWake: HarsherPenaltiesand the "Successful" Criminal
Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965); Note, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions,
supra note 10 at 159 et seq.
63. 395 U.S. at 725.
64. Id. at 725-26 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 724.
66. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
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imposing a longer sentence is legitimate and most compelling when the
increase is based on certain conduct engaged in by the defendant after
the first sentencing. Information regarding post-sentence conduct may
demonstrate that the defendant is more incorrigible than originally
thought. Likewise, the deterrent or "chilling" effect on the right of appeal is appreciably reduced if convicted criminal defendants contemplating appeal are assured that a higher sentence may be imposed upon
reconviction only if it is expressly based on post-sentencing conduct.67
By requiring such affirmative findings, the PearceCourt effectively limited a state's ability to impose higher sentences on reconviction. It
thereby made any impingement upon the right of appeal minimal, and
confined the exercise of the power to impose a higher sentence to instances where the state's interest is legitimate and strong.
The scope of the Pearce due process approach was more closely
defined in two later cases involving state-created criminal procedural
rights. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,6 the petitioner had been convicted
of robbery and sentenced by a jury to fifteen years imprisonment. He
successfully appealed, was retried and convicted, and this time sentenced by ajury to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's claim that Pearce barred the higher sentence. First, since
the second jury was unaware of the prior sentence and appeal, there
could be no claim that the higher sentence was the product of vindictiveness toward a defendant for exercising his right of appeal. 69 Second, the Court concluded that the policy of allowing a second jury,
ignorant of the first sentence and appeal, to impose a higher second
sentence did not create a sigificant deterrent to would-be criminal appellants.70 Therefore, since vindictiveness was not the motivating force
behind the increased sentence and the state had not burdened the right
to appeal through deterrence, the Court held that there had been no
violation of due process.
Blackledge v. Perry7 involved a North Carolina right to a trial de
novo in superior court for any defendant convicted of a misdemeanor
in district court. When the petitioner filed a notice of appeal following
his conviction in district court for a misdemeanor, he was indicted for a
felony based on the same conduct. He pled guilty to the indictment in
superior court and was sentenced to a term of five to seven years in
prison, as compared with his original district court sentence of six
67. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The requirement that the reasons for
imposing a higher second sentence affirmatively appear and be based on conduct occurring
after the original sentencing also serves as a prophylactic device to guard against hidden
vindictiveness. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
69. Id. at 26.
70. Id. at 33-34.
71. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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months. The Supreme Court found the prosecutor's action in obtaining
the felony indictment subject to the two defects which were fatal to the
state policy in Pearce: the higher superior court charge may have reflected a vindictive intent to punish the defendant for exercising his
right to appeal the district court conviction, and the prosecutor's unrestrained power to "up the ante" was likely to have a chilling effect on
the exercise of the right. 72 Accordingly, the felony conviction was overturned.
The due process analysis in Pearce, Chaffin and Perry has the effect of protecting state-created criminal procedural rights from indirect
burdens in much the same way as an indirect violation approach protects federal constitutional rights. This is because the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state from depriving
an individual of "life, liberty or property"7 3 within a procedural framework which deters or penalizes the exercise of state-created rights. The
state may not act vindictively to increase a defendant's sentence because he has exercised a right, since this clearly constitutes a penalty.
Nor may the state grant prosecutors or judges an unlimited power to
impose higher charges or sentences on defendants who have invoked
state-created rights, since such discretion may not only mask a vindictive motive, but may also serve to deter criminal defendants contemplating the exercise of that right. As noted earlier, in an indirect
violation analysis the test for whether a federal right has been impinged
is whether the exercise of that right has been penalized or deterred.7 4
Hence, the same type of burden which impinges a federal right under
an indirect violation of right approach violates due process when imposed upon a state-created criminal procedure right.
D.

Equal Protection

A third manner in which the Court has approached unconstitutional condition questions has been through application of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under current equal
protection analysis, a law which creates a classification impinging a
fundamental right or interest will be subject to "strict scrutiny," and
may be justified only if it serves a compelling state interest. A classification which neither infringes a fundamental right or interest nor creates a "suspect classification" will pass constitutional muster if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.7 5 The problems raised
72.
73.
74.
75.
School
(1969).

Id. at 28.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977); San Antonio Independent
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-34
See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward In Search of
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by the infringement of a fundamental interest or the creation of a suspect classification are beyond the scope of this note. What is involved
here is the equal protection of fundamental rights.
Prior to Maher v. Roe,76 the right to travel was virtually the only
fundamental right considered by the Supreme Court in an equal protection context.77 The first of these right to travel cases was Shapiro v.
Thompson,78 where the issue was whether a state could make one year
of residency a prerequisite for welfare benefits. The effect of the requirement, noted the Court, was to create two classes of indigents "indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of
residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents
who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. ' 79 The Court
held that the law unfavorably discriminated against new residents in a
way which burdened the right to travel interstate and to make a new
home, an implied constitutional right recognized in earlier cases as fundamental."0 The Court reviewed the regulation under the compelling
state interest standard.8' 1 Finding no such interest present, the requirement was ruled unconstitutional. Citing Jackson, the opinion stressed
that a purported purpose of deterring the migration of indigents was
not legitimate since this was no more than an interest in discouraging
citizens from asserting constitutional rights.8 2 Nor could the state justify the requirement on the basis of a desire to reduce welfare costs.
Fiscal interests alone, 83
said the Court, cannot justify "'an otherwise invidious classification.
The Court relied upon similar analysis in Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County,84 which involved an Arizona statute requiring an in-

digent to be a county resident for twelve months to qualify for free
non-emergency medical care. The Court found the statute violative of
equal protection. The Court clarified Shapiro as to the impact upon a
fundamental right required in order to constitute an impingement:
"The Court [in Shapiro] spoke of the requisite impact in two ways.
First, we considered whether the waiting period would deter migration. .

.

. Second, the Court considered the extent to which the resi-

Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Proteciton,86 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1972).
76. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
77. Gunther, supra note 75, at 8.
78. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
79. Id. at 627.
80. Id. at 629-32, relying on, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
81. 394 U.S. at 634.
82. .d. at 631.
83. Id. at 633.
84. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year
residency requirement for voting held unconstitutional).
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dence requirement served to penalize the exercise of the right to
travel.""5 The Court concluded that Arizona's residency requirement
for indigent medical care impinged upon the right to travel in both
respects, by discouraging indigents with serious illnesses from migrating and penalizing those indigents who did migrate.8 6 Therefore, as in
Shapiro, the statute was subjected to strict scrutiny, found to be unsupported8 7by any compelling state interest, and declared unconstitutional.
The use of equal protection to safeguard the federal right of interestate travel from the imposition of an unconstitutional condition raises
two questions, both noted by Justice Harlan in his Shapiro dissent.8 8
First, if interstate travel is a fundamental constitutional right, why utilize an equal protection analysis at all; why not strike down the residency requirements in cases such as Shapiro and MemorialHospitalas
indirect violations of the right to travel itself? 8 9 Second, is the indirect
violation of an implied constitutional right the proper subject of a compelling state interest test? 9°
The first question has never been satisfactorily answered by the
Court. If the reason that residency requirements are approached
through equal protection analysis rather than indirect violation analysis is that the right to travel is a "weaker" right, since it is implied
rather than explicit in the Constitution, 9 ' then Shapiro renders any distinction between the two approaches unimportant. Under the equal
protection approach, an indirect burden upon a fundamental right automatically yields two classes: one receiving a privilege and one denied
it, the basis of classification being the exercise of the right. 92 If the
discrimination sufficiently penalizes or deters the exercise of the right,
then strict scrutiny is invoked and a legitimate and compelling state
interest served by the law must be shown.9 3 The result would be the
same were the implied right protected under the indirect violation approach followed in the Keyishian-Sherbert-Jackson line of cases.
85. Id. at 257 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 257-62.
87. Id. at 262-70.

88. 394 U.S. at 655.
89. Id. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",62
CORNELL L. REv. 405, 418 (1977); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Con-

stitution, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 989, 1002-03 (1969).
90. 394 U.S. at 661, 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. See id But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977): "The Court's premise is that
only an equal protection claim is presented here. Claims of interference with enjoyment of
fundamental rights have, however, occupied a rather protean position in our constitutional
jurisprudence." Id. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
93. Id. at 634; See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57
(1974).
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Under this approach, if the indirect burden upon the right, that is the

discriminatory allotment of the privilege, sufficiently deters and penalizes its exercise, then the right is impinged and a legitimate and compelling state interest must be shown.9 4 Hence, implied rights are
granted the same constitutional protection as express rights, with one

difference: express rights are protected against indirect infringement by
indirect violation analysis, while implied rights are protected by equal

protection analysis. In practice, this difference is one of form, not substance.
The second question raised by Harlan's dissent concerns what he
feared was the potential for a limitless extension of equal protection
strict scrutiny analysis through the use of the fundamental rights and

interests concept. 5 Rather than subject those laws which indirectly

burdened an implicit fundamental right to the rigorous compelling
state interest standard, he would have balanced the interests of the state

against the burden placed upon the particular right.96 In applying this
balance in Shapiro, Harlan indicated that the fact that the burden was
indirect rather than direct weighed more heavily in favor of validating
the state policy.97 Moreover, Harlan stated, a state had a legitimate
interest in discouraging individuals from travelling to a state in order to
collect welfare benefits. 98 To support his position, Harlan offered the

example of a state wishing to establish "unusually generous welfare
programs." In this case, the state should be permitted to utilize the
unconstitutional condition of a residency requirement to prevent its

grant of a benefit from becoming too economically burdensome for the

state.99 These issues-the relative weakness of implied rights, the

proper standard to be applied in the case of an indirect, as opposed to
direct, burden on a right and the legitimacy of a state interest in indi94. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
95. "1 think [requiring a compelling state interest to be shown where a fundamental
right or interest is involved] particularly unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates an exception which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule.
Virtually every state statute affects important rights. This Court has repeatedly held, for
example, that the traditional equal protection standard is applicable to statutory classifications affecting such fundamental matters as the right to pursue a particular occupation, the
right to receive greater or smaller wages or to work more or less hours, and the right to
inherit property. Rights such as these are in principle indistinguishable from those involved
here, and to extend the 'compelling interest' rule to all cases in which such rights are affected
would go far toward making this Court a 'superlegislature.'" 394 U.S. at 661 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
96. In Shapiro, Justice Harlan felt the proper inquiry was "whether the governmental
interests served by residence requirements outweigh the burden imposed on the right to
travel." Id. at 674. "I believe that the balance definitely favors constitutionality," he concluded. Id. at 676.
97. Id. at 676.
98. Id. at 672.
99. Id. at 674-75.
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rectly discouraging the exercise of implied rights-go to the heart of
Maher v. Roe' and will be further discussed later in this note. 1° 1
E. Summary
Before an examination of Maher v. Roe °2 and Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,'13 it would be helpful to summarize the Supreme Court's position on unconstitutional conditions just prior to Maher. Although a
purported unconstitutional condition could be approached through one
of three avenues-as an indirect violation of a right, a violation of due
process or a denial of equal protection-the net analysis is virtually
identical. The Court first examines whether the questioned policy has a
sufficient impact upon the right, by penalizing and deterring its exercise, so as to constitute an impingement. If the right is burdened, the
state must show that the impingement is necessary to achieve a legitimate and compelling interest. If the state fails to so justify the law, it
will be held unconstitutional.
Since at least 1963 the Court has openly acknowledged that the
right-privilege distinction no longer governs its approach to unconstitu-

tional conditions. 1°4 Instead, government policies conditioning enjoy-

ment of a privilege upon the waiver of a constitutional right are

subjected to the rigorous examination set forth above.'0

The main basis for judicial hostility toward unconstitutional conditions is that a government should not be allowed to do indirectly
what it may not do directly-prevent the exercise of constitutional
rights.l0 6 This idea becomes increasingly persuasive in an age where an
ever expanding bounty of governmentally granted privileges and bene100. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
101. See text accompanying notes 235-45 infra.
102. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
103. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
104. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Perhaps the retreat is first explicit in
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
105. By 1972 in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, the Supreme Court was able to cite
almost twenty cases in support of the following statement: "For at least a quarter-century,
this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to
'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' . . . Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible." Id. at 597.
106. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
at 405 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 144546.
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fits are dispersed to a significant percentage of the populace. 0 7 In the
pre-welfare state era of Justice Holmes, civil servant positions and
other government benefits were scarce. Conditions placed upon such
largess affected only a small number of beneficiaries, who were perceived as receiving an exceptional gratuity. Today, however, few citizens have never taken advantage of some government privilege such as
a job, welfare, unemployment compensation or state-subsidized higher
education. To allow modern governments to exact, as the price of obtaining these benefits, the waiver of constitutional rights would be to
allow government a substantial power to buy up unpopular rights.
As government has responded to meet society's needs through the
wholesale granting of state-funded privileges, popular and legal conceptions have correspondingly changed. The in-state student whose
qualifications entitle him or her to enroll in a state college, or the laidoff factory worker applying for unemployment benefits do not perceive
themselves as receiving charity bestowed by a bountiful state. Rather,
these privileges are viewed as a form of entitlement 0 8 to be granted
nonarbitrarily to thsoe who attain the requisite status. Psychologically,
as well as practically, it made little difference to Adell Sherbert whether
she was deprived of unemployment benefits she was otherwise entitled
to for attending Saturday worship or was forced to pay a penal fine in
the same amount for her Sabbath observance. That which Holmes
viewed as mere privilege evolved over sixty-five years into a common
form of possession worthy of constitutional protection. Viewing the
problem from a more contemporary perspective, the Warren Court
finally granted this protection.
II. The Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes Decisions
A.

Maher v. Roe

Maher v. Roe

°9

involved1 a Connecticut welfare regulation" 0Olim-

107. See Van Alstyne supranote 10, at 1461-64; Note, UnconstitutwnalConditions,supra

note 10, at 1596.
108. The term "property" has been used with regard to such go emnment privileges as
civil service jobs and welfare benefits. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601; Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van
Alstyne, supra note 10, at 1461-66.
109. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).

110.

CONN. WELF. DEP'T., PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL

§ 275 (1975), pro-

viding in relevant part:
The Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions are met:
1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medically necessary.
The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric necessity.
2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or licensed clinic
when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy. ...
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iting state Medicaid benefits for first and second trimester abortions to
those found to be medically necessary to protect the physical and psychological well-being of the mother. The federal district court for Connecticut had ruled that the equal protection clause barred the state
from excluding nontherapeutic abortions from a welfare program
which funded medical expenses incidental to pregnancy and childbirth."'I The court's decision was based upon'its reading of the Roe v.
Wade12 holding "that encompassed within a woman's constitutional
right of personal privacy is the unfettered right to terminate a pregnancy through an abortion . . . during the first trimester .. .. 113
Connecticut's program, in favoring indigent women selecting childbirth
over those electing abortion, infringed this fundamental right in the
same manner as the residency requirements in Shapiro and Maricopa
County abridged the right to travel." a Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court struck down the statute."15
In June, 1977, the Supreme Court reversed this decision by a six to
three vote, with Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissenting." 6 Speaking for the majority, Justice Powell agreed that a state, in
dispensing public benefits, is required under the equal protection clause
to justify differential treatment within its programs."17 The district
court had erred, however, in concluding that Connecticut's policy impinged upon a "fundamental right to abortion," requiring strict scrutiny of the law."' Rather the Court drew a carefully phrased
3.

The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, and in the
case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.

4.

Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social Services.
11I. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) (three-judge district court decision).
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. 408 F. Supp. at 663.
114. See text accompanying notes 75-87 supra.
115. The state's asserted interest in fiscal economy was found to be "wholly chimerical"
since it would cost the state more to fund a childbirth than to pay for a welfare recipient's
abortion. 408 F. Supp. at 664. The state was also foreclosed from defending its policy on
the basis of a moral objection to abortion: "To sanction such a justification would be to

permit discrimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis
that the state simply does not approve of the exercise of that right." Id. The Court concluded that the state had failed to justify the classification on the basis of any compelling
state interest or even any rational relationship and that the regulation was, therefore, unconstitutional. Id.
116. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In the companion case of Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.

438 (1977) the Court held that the Medicaid regulation involved in Aaher did not conflict
with Title XIX (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (Supp. V
1970).
117. 432 U.S. at 470.
118. Id. at 470-71.
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distinction between an "unqualified right" and a right only to be free
from affirmative government interference:
Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an
abortion," as the District Court seemed to think. Rather, the
right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
It implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 9
Thus defined, the right to select an abortion was not infringed because
there was no affirmative government interference, even though the
classification utilized by the regulation would, the Court admitted, influence women to forgo their right to an abortion 20 in order to gain an
advantage granted only to those who choose childbirth. 2 '
The Court distinguished Shapiro and Maricopa County on the
ground that the regulations in those cases "penalized" the right to
travel in a manner not present in Maher:
Penalties are most familiar to the criminal law, where criminal
sanctions are imposed as a consequence of proscribed conduct.
Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare
to one who had recently exercised the right to travel across state
analogous to a criminal fine to justify strict
lines was sufficiently
22
judicial scrutiny.'
The Court also distinguished Sherbert v. Verner'23 on the basis that the
establishment and freedom of religion clauses imposed a "governmental obligation of neturality" as to a citizen's choices, not present in the
case of the right to an abortion. 124 Presumably, what the Court meant
is that under the First Amendment a citizen's choice of religious belief
is an "unqualified" right which is infringed by discrimination in favor
of one religion over another. In contrast, since the right to choose an
abortion is not "unqualified," the state may, in providing privileges
such as medicaid, discriminate against women who select abortions so
long as the discrimination places no additional "obstacles . . .in the
pregnant woman's path to an abortion"' 125 and does not take theform
of a penalty.
119. Id. at 473-74.
120. Id. at 474. "As a practical matter, many indigent women will feel they have no
choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the State will pay for the associated
medical services, even though they would have chosen to have abortions if the State had also
provided funds for that procedure, or indeed if the State had provided funds for neither
procedure." Id. at 482-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 474.
122. Id. at 474 n.8.
123. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 474.
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Also distinguishable, the Court noted, are cases involving the
criminal justice system. In those cases the citizen is forced by the state
to participate, and, therefore, the state is constitutionally obligated to
compensate for a defendant's indigency by providing him with the full
range of options in defending himself. 26 Where abortions are involved, however, the state neither forces citizens to participate in the
abortion-childbirth choice, nor does it monopolize the means to obtain
abortions.
To support the distinction between an unqualified right and a right
to be free of affirmative state interference, the Court relied on Meyer v.
NebraskaI 7 and Pierce v. Sociey of Sisters. 21 In these cases, decided
over forty years prior to Maher, the Court had struck down laws
prohibiting the teaching of German to children and banning private
education. In Roe v. Wade 129 the cases were cited as providing historical "roots" for the type of personal liberty which the Court found to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 ' But in Maher the Court
emphasized that Meyer and Peirce had defined "the liberty of parents. . . to direct the. . . education of (their) children" exclusively in
terms of a right to provide privately subsidized learning free from unreasonable state control.'' Neither case, said the Court, "denied to a
State the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the power of the
State 'to prescribe a curriculum' that included English and excluded
German in its free public schools 'is not questioned.' 132
Having thus rejected the need for strict scrutiny, the Maher Court
next considered whether the regulation met the less exacting standard
of being "'rationally related' to a 'constitutionally permissible' purpose."' 3 The Court held that "encouraging normal childbirth" is a
"strong and legitimate interest"' 34 and that "[t]he subsidizing of costs
incidental to childbirth is a rational means" of achieving that end. 3'
Thus the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from the Connecticut
Medicaid program was ruled to be constitutionally permissible, despite
the state's discrimination in favor of women selecting childbirth over
those women choosing abortion.
The majority, however, did not consider whether the regulation
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 471 n.6.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 152.
432 U.S. at 476-77 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35).
Id. (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402).
432 U.S. at 478.
Id.
Id. at 479.
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placed an indirect burden upon the constitutional right defined in Roe
v. Wade. Such use of an indirect violation approach did not elude the
dissenters. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall, quickly dismissesd the majority's equal protection approach and
attacked the statute as an indirect violation of the abortion right:
The Court's premise is that only an equal protection claim is
presented here. Claims of interference with enjoyment of fundamental rights have, however, occupied a rather protean position
in our constitutional jurisprudence. Whether or not the Court's
analysis may reasonably proceed under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court plainly errs in ignoring, as it does, the unanswerable argument of appellees, and the holding of the District
their
Court, that the regulation unconstitutionally impinges upon
36
claim of privacy derived from the Due Process Clause.1
Brennan rejected the distinction between affirmative government interference with the right to select abortion and state encouragement of
childbirth through discriminatory funding. In either case, a constitutional right was infringed. Such infringement could be justified only by
a compelling state interest. 13 7 Connecticut's policy of funding childbirth but not abortion served to "discourag[e] significantly the exercise
of a fundamental constitutional right" by imposing financial pressures
on indigent women to forego abortions they might otherwise choose to
have.' 38 Justice Brennan found the questioned regulation indistinguishable in principle from those found invalid in Shapiro v. Thompson, 13 9 Sherbert v. Verner 140 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County,141 where state financial benefits had been granted or withheld
as to coerce would-be recipients to forgo constituin such a manner
142
tional rights.
Brennan also disagreed with the majority's acceptance of "encouraging normal childbirth" as a legitimate state concern. Roe v. Wade
had stated that "'[w]ith respect to the State's important and legitimate
interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability' occurring at about the end of the second trimester."' 143 The state should not
be allowed to assert a concern for the potential life of the fetus in the
first or second trimester in order to justify interfering with the mother's
136. Id. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The district court did not utilize an indirect
violation approach, as this quotation seems to suggest. That court held that since the abortion right was impinged, equal protection required that the regulation be subjected to the
compelling state interest standard. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. at 663-64.
137. 432 U.S. at 485-89.
138. Id. at 489.
139. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
140. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
142. 432 U.S. at 487-89.
143. Id. at 490 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163).
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abortion decision during this period. 1 "

Justice Blackmun was more terse in his evaluation of the Court's
action. He too believed that the majority had unjustifiably validated an
unconstitutional condition: "The Court today, by its decisions in these

cases, allows the States,. ..to accomplish indirectly what the Court in
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton-by a substantial majority and 1with
45
some emphasis, I had thought-said they could not do directly."'

Thus, in Maher, the Court utilized a narrow reading of the abortion right in the context of an equal protection analysis to avoid striking down the Connecticut regulation as an invalid unconstitutional
condition. Six months later, it again confronted a state policy which
arguably deterred and penalized the exercise of constitutional rights.
The Court, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,14 further narrowed the constitutional prohibition against unconstitutional conditions placed upon
privileges.
B. Bordenkircher v. Hayes
At issue in Bordenkircher was whether a Kentucky district attorney had acted improperly in reindicting a criminal defendant on a
more severe charge expressly because the defendant had refused to
plead guilty and forgo his right to a jury trial. The defendant, Hayes,
was originally indicted for uttering a forged instrument, an offense
punishable under Kentucky law by two to ten years' imprisonment.
During a plea-bargaining meeting with Hayes and his attorney, the
prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years if Hayes
would plead guilty to the offense as charged. If he did not do so, the
prosecutor threatened to have him reindicted as a habitual offender on
the basis of his two prior felony convictions-a charge which carried a
mandatory life sentence upon conviction. Hayes refused to plead
tried and
guilty and the prosecutor carried out his threat; Hayes was
147
convicted of the higher charge and given a life sentence.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on North Carolina v.
144. Id. at 489-90.
145. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan
and Marshall, JJ.) (dissent also applied to Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v.

Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)).
Justice Marshall also dissented separately. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454. He restated
his longstanding criticism of the two-tier equal protection model (see Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) and argued in
favor of an approach which would weigh "the importance of the governmental benefits denied [to the class discriminated against], the character of the class, and the asserted state
interests." 432 U.S. at 458 (quoting Massachussets Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 322 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
146. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
147. Id. at 358-59.
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Pearce14 8 and Blackledge v. Perry,4 9 held that the prosecutor's actions
violated due process.' 50 Pearce and Perry, stated the court, barred the
government from acting out of vindictiveness toward a defendant for
"insisting upon his constitutional right to stand trial." ' 5 ' Here, a vindictive motive for the higher reindictment was openly admitted by the
prosecutor.' 52 Accordingly, the appellate court ordered that Hayes'
conviction as a habitual offender be reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed by a five to four vote, holding that
Kentucky had not deprived Hayes of liberty without due process. The
majority, per Justice Stewart, conceded that the prosecutor's actions
had the practical effect of deterring the defendant from asserting his
rights to plead not guilty and have a jury trial, 53 and that he had suffered an increased penalty solely because he had chosen to exercise
those rights.' 5 a Yet the Court distinguished Pearce and Perry by emphasizing that in those cases the state had "unilaterally impos[ed].
a penalty upon a defendant" for exercising a right, 55 whereas the
stepped-up indictment against Hayes was incidental to a bilateral bargaining process:
To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort
... ,and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action
whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal
rights is "patently unconstitutional." But in the "give-and-take"
of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or
the accused is free to accept or reject the
retaliation so long 1as
56
prosecution's offer.
The Court also indicated that the state's interest in persuading a defendant not to assert his right to trial is a permissible one: "It follows
that by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court
has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality
is to persuade the
that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table
157
defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty."'
148. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See notes 60-67 and accompanying text supra.
149. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). See notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text supra.
150. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976).
151. Id. at 45.
152. The prosecutor stated in open court that he intentionally sought the higher reindictment because Hayes insisted upon a trial. Id. at 43 n.2.
153. "[C]onfronting a defendant with the risk of more punishment clearly may have a
'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights.... "Id. at 364 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
154. "[Ihe course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case . . . openly
presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges
" 547 F.2d at 365.
on which he was plainly subject to prosecution ...
155. Id. at 362.
156. Id. at 363 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 364.
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The latter portion of the majority opinion was expressly attacked
by Justice Powell. In his dissent, Powell reiterated the prior holdings of
Jackson and Pearce:
We have stated in unequivocal terms, in discussing United States
v. Jackson. . . and North Carolinav. Pearce. . . , that "Jackson
and Pearce are clear and subsequent cases have not dulled their
force: if the only objective of a state practice is to discourage the
assertion of constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "158

Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, indicated that he was not convinced by the majority's distinction between the prosecutorial vindictiveness in Pearce and
Perry and the reindictment of Hayes because of his unwillingness to
plead guilty. Since the prosecutor's admitted purpose in obtaining the
new indictment was to discourage the exercise of the right to trial, this
action, in Justice Blackmun's view, violated due process:
I.

.

. do not understand why, as in Pearce, due process does not

require that the prosecution justify its action on some basis other
than discouraging respondent from the exercise of his right to a
trial.
I perceive little difference between vindictiveness after
what the Court describes. . . as the exercise of a "legal right to
attack his original conviction," and vindictiveness in the "'giveand-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.'"
Prosecutorial vindictiveness in any context is still prosecutorial
vindictiveness. The Due Process Clause should protect an accused against it, however it asserts itself.'59
By utilizing a due process analysis, the Court in Hayes, as in
Maher, avoided the issue of unconstitutional conditions. This was accomplished by emphasizing that any unpleasant price placed upon
Hayes' exercise of constitutional rights came about as part of a bilateral
bargaining process, and was therefore not a product of vindictiveness.160 The next section of this note analyzes the validity of these two
158. Id. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32
n.20 (1973)).
159. Id. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.) (quoting from the majority opinion at 362).
160. By emphasizing "vindictiveness," the Court seemed to indicate that the questions
involved in Hayes were essentially those of procedural fairness under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The rights to plead not guilty and to demand a jury trial,
however, are encompassed within the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). These rights have been made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Thus Hayes is distinguishable from cases like North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), which involved purely state-created
rights. In Pearce and Perry, defendants exercising such rights were entitled to protection
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decisions, focusing on the Court's treatment of the nature of the penalty
involved, its distinction between qualified and unqualified rights, and
the state purposes underlying the policies in both cases.
III.

Analysis

A. Maker v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes Compared
The results and analyses utilized in Maher and Hayes are strikingly parallel. In both cases the Court was confronted with theoretical
unconstitutional conditions: in Maher,the privilege of subsidized medical treatment was conditioned on the forgoing of the right to choose an
abortion; in Hayes, the privilege of prosecutorial leniency was conditioned on the defendant's waiving the right to plead not guilty and have
a jury trial. In both situations, the citizen was subjected to significant
pressure to give up the right in order to take advantage of the privilege.
1. Impingement
In Maher and Hayes the majority opinions acknowledged that
6
there was present both (1) deterrence from the exercise of the right;' 1
and (2) disadvantage suffered solely because of a decision to exercise
the right.' 62 In prior unconstitutional condition cases the presence of
these two factors had resulted in a finding of impingement of a right.
Yet in Aaher and Hayes no impingement was found to exist.
In Maher the Court held that the right to abortion had not been
infringed because (1) this right is not an unqualified constitutional right
but only a right to be free of unduly burdensome interference by the
state; 63 and (2) in the case of such a limited right, infringement is present only if (a) the law affirmatively imposes an obstacle to the exercise
of the right;'1 64 or (b) the law is sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine
penalizing the exercise of the right.' 65 Since the Connecticut Medicaid
regulation, in denying to indigent women choosing abortion an advantage enjoyed by indigent women giving birth, neither imposed an affirmative obstacle nor constituted such a penalty, there was no
infringement present.
from "vindictiveness" only on the basis of procedural fairness. They possessed no federal
rights of appeal or trial de novo. Hayes, on the other hand, possessed federal constitutional
rights both to procedural fairness and to a jury trial in order to determine his guilt. Therefore, the Court should have examined not only whether Hayes' rights had been violated by
unfair "vindictiveness," but also whether his federal rights to plead not guilty and to a jury
trial had been impinged.
161. See notes 120, 153 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 121, 154 and accompanying text supra.
163. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
164. Id.
165. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
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Similarly, in Hayes, deterrence of those seeking to exercise constitutional fights and the comparative disadvantage suffered by those who
do exercise these fights were held to be insufficient factors to constitute
an infringement of these rights or to violate due process. The majority
opinion reaches this conclusion by apparently equating a constitutional
violation with either (a) affirmative prevention of the defendant's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial; or (b) the unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant exercising these rights. 166 The prosecutor's action of reindicting Hayes did not prevent the defendant from
obtaining a jury trial. Any disadvantage suffered by Hayes because of
his assertion of his rights to plead not guilty and go before a jury came
about not as a result of any unilateral decision by the prosecutor to
punish Hayes for exercising these rights, but as part of a bargaining
process in which Hayes participated. Therefore, the reindictment was
constitutional.
2. Legitimate State Interest
A second important similarity of the Maher and Hayes opinions is
that both accept as legitimate and worthy of judicial weight, state purposes of dissuading the exercise of constitutional rights. The Maher
opinion refers to a legitimate state interest in encouraging normal
childbirth over abortion.167 Hayes refers to the constitutionally legitito persuade the defendant to forgo his
mate interest of the prosecutor
68
right to plead not guilty.'
The Maher and Hayes decisions produced similar alignments
within the Court, with the exception of Justice Powell, who wrote the
Maher opinion and dissented in Hayes. 69 Presumably he took seriously the distinction articulated in his Maher opinion, that in cases in
which the state places a citizen in a dilemma by virtue of a governmental monopoly in which participation is compelled, the government must
enable the citizen to exercise his or her full range of constitutional options. 7 0 The criminal justice system is such a state-created monopoly.
On the other hand, since the state does not create or "monopolize" the
dilemma of pregnancy, apparently state neutrality as to constitutional
options in that situation is not thought by Justice Powell to be required.
In the remainder of this section this note will examine the three
important issues that these two cases pose with regard to the future
treatment of unconstitutional condition problems: (1) whether the Burger Court is creating a new and higher threshold for determining when
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See
See
See
See
See

notes 155, 156 and accompanying text supra.
note 134 and accompanying text supra.
note 157 and accompanying text supra.
note 153 and accompanying text supra.
note 126 and accompanying text supra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:165

a right has been impinged by an indirect burden and whether this new
standard is proper; (2) whether the Maher Court was correct in distinguishing between an "unqualified right" and a right to be free from
affirmative government interference and whether this distinction is desirable; (3) whether the government should be able to justify its policies
by putting forth a state interest in dissuading the exercise of fundamental rights. These issues will be discussed in turn.
B.

Impingement-Penalty and Deterrence?

The common thread in cases involving indirect burdens is that the
citizens involved are not affirmatively prevented from, or compelled by
law to forgo, exercising a right. Instead, the claim is made that a right
has been violated because an individual is denied a desired benefit or
privilege for having exercised this right.'
Such a claim poses a threshhold question: at what point does the state, by the act of withholding a
benefit or privilege, impinge upon a constitutional right?
According to Maher and Hayes, the answer appears to be that an
indirect burden exists only when the state policy denying a privilege or
benefit penalizes the exercise of the right. Translated, this means that
unless a policy takes a conceptual form of a penalty upon a right, no
impingement exists. The Court did not deny that the policies in question placed comparative hardships upon citizens exercising rights vis-Avis similarly situated citizens not doing so,' 7 2 but rather implied that it
was the manner by which such hardships were imposed that was constitutionally significant. 7 3 This emphasis upon the manner rather than
upon the magnitude of comparative hardship shows that what is meant
by "penalty" in Maher and Hayes is the form of a penalty, not the
effect of a penalty.
Both Maher and Hayes indicated that deterrence was not a factor
to be weighed in determining whether a right has been impinged. Conceding that deterrence was a by-product of the state policies involved,
the Court nevertheless
did not deem this relevant to the outcome in
74
either case.
This is a questionable result, because past authority, including the
very cases cited by these opinions, does not support such a standard.
171.
172.
173.

See note 44 supra.
See notes 121, 154 and accompanying text supra.
In Maher the Court distinguished Shapiro and Maricopa County on the grounds

that in those cases the state policies involved were "sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine"
upon the right to travel to be considered a "penalty" upon it. 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8. In
Hayes, the Court made a similar distinction between the state's unconstitutionally acting to
"penalize" the exercise of a right and "the give-and-take" of plea bargaining, [where] there
is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or
reject the prosecution's offer." 434 U.S. 357, 363.
174. See notes 120, 153 and accompanying text supra.
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Instead, impingement upon a right has previously been measured in
terms of the extent to which the policy (1) deters the exercise of the
right, and (2) has the effect of a penalty by causing comparative disadvantage and hardship to individuals exercising the right.
Maricopa County, Jackson and Pearce all indicated that deterrence
is a factor in determining if impingement is present. 7 5 The only case
that could be read as supporting the abandonment of this factor was
Chaffin. There the Court did state that "the Constitution [does not]
forbid every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that
'7 6
has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights."'
This does not mean, however, that deterrence will not be weighed in
deciding whether a right has been infringed. Later in the opinion, the
Court stressed that the amount of deterrent effect upon a defendant
contemplating an appeal is minimal where, at worst, upon retrial he
would risk a higher sentence at the hands of a jury who is unaware of
his first conviction and appeal, and therefore is unable to deliberately
penalize the appeal.' 77 "While it may not be wholly unrealistic for a
convicted defendant to anticipate the occurrence of each of these events
[necessary to receive a higher sentence], we cannot agree with petitioner that such speculative prospects interfere with the right to make a
free choice whether to appeal."'' 17 Chaffin may indicate that deterrence
alone is not sufficient to constitute an infringement of a right. But it
does not hold, as does Hayes, that deterrence is insufficient when it is
founded upon a realistic assessment that the government will deliber175. That deterrence was previously considered to be a separate factor in weighing if a
right was infringed is borne out in Maricopa County. There the Court stated the test for
deciding if there was sufficient impact upon the right to travel to find infringement and
invoke the compelling state interest test: [In Shapiro] [the Court spoke of the requisite
impact in two ways. First, we considered whether the waiting period would deter migration:
"An indigent who desires to migrate. . .will doubtless hesitate if he knows he must risk
making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance..." 415
U.S. at 257 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629). Likewise the Court in Jackson emphasized
that the statute in question was found unconstitutional because it had "the inevitable effect. . .[of discouraging] assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and [of
deterring] exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial." 390 U.S. at 58 1.
The Pearce Court, in ruling that a higher sentence upon reconviction after appeal was permissible only for explicitly stated reasons relating to events after the first sentencing also
stressed the factor of deterrence: "Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in
the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such
a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." 395 U.S. at 725.
176. 412 U.S. at 30 (cited in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363).
177. "The first prerequisite for the imposition of a retaliatory penalty is knowledge of the
prior sentence. It has been conceded in this case that the jury was not informed of the prior
sentence." 412 U.S. at 26. See also id. at 29-35.
178. Id. at 34-35. (emphasis added)
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ately increase one's penalty based upon the exercise of a right.'7 9 Thus
the Court's disregard of the fact that the state policies examined in
Maher and Hayes discouraged the assertion of constitutional rights

may be seen as an innovation.
A more amorphous question is whether there is any precedent for
the Court's holdings in Maher and Hayes that the exercise of a right
may not be deemed penalized in instances where this exercise admit-

tedly leads to the suffering of hardship or disadvantage. While the
term "penalty" has not been previously defined with precision by the
Supreme Court, in Maricopa County the Court cited with approval an
analysis of Shapiro by Judge Coffin: 18 0 "using 'penalty' in what ap-

pears to be the right context, i e., not in the sense of a criminal or civil
sanction, plaintiffs and others in their class can truly be said to suffer

'disadvantage, loss or hardship due to some action.' "11 This conclusion is consistent with the reasoning of Shapiro and MaricopaCounty,
cases which go to great lengths to evaluate the hardship which the residency requirements placed upon citizens exercising their right to travel.
Neither case, on the other hand, discusses how such requirements are
in form "analogous to a criminal fine,"' 82 as the Court in Maher stated.

The distinction that Maher seeks to make is, presumably, that only
when the state withholds a privilege unrelated to a particular right does

it impermissibly punish one for exercising the right. 8 3 Such was the
179. "We reiterate that we are dealing here only with the case in which jury sentencing is
utilized for legitimate purposes and not as a means of punishing or penalizing the assertion
of protected rights. Jackson and Pearce are clear and subsequent cases have not dulled their
force: if the only objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of constitutional
rights it is 'patently unconstitutional."' Id. at 32-33 n.20 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 631 (1969)).
180. 415 U.S. 250, 257 n.10.
181. Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970) (two-year residency
requirement for admission to federally funded low cost housing held violative.of equal protection).
182. In Shapiro v. Thompson the Court states: "All citizens [should] be free to travel
throughout. . . our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement." 394 U.S. 618, 629. The use of the terms "burden" and
"restrict" would indicate that it is actual hardship and disadvantage that concern the Court,
not the form the disadvantage takes.
Likewise in MemorialHospital v. Maricopa County the Court discusses the detrimental
effect a residency requirement for receiving free non-emergency medical attention may have
upon an indigent immigrant's health. 415 U.S. 250, 259-61.
183. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had
recently exercised the right to travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a
criminal fine to justify strict judicial scrutiny.
"If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women N ho had obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we would have a close analogy to the
facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or
the analysis we have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is that
the State penalizes the woman's decision to have an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Sha-
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case in Shapiro where the state withheld the unrelated privilege of welfare from citizens who had exercised their right to travel. In Maher,
however, Connecticut had not withheld any unrelated privileges from
women exercising their right to have an abortion. It merely chose not
to subsidize the exercise of the abortion right, thus withholding the enabling privilege, while at the same time providing the enabling privilege for the alternative of childbearing. The Court reasoned that no
penalty was present when disadvantage was attached to the exercise of
a right in this form, through discrimination in providing means to exercise it.
This framework has been expressly rejected in a line of decisions
involving the First Amendment rights of unpopular speakers to use
public forums such as streets and parks. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a municipality cannot discriminate in providing the
forum for some speakers and withholding it from others. For instance,
to
a city may not use the broad discretion of a license-issuing practice 84
selectively deny use of a public park to disfavored speech makers.'
Nor may it deny use of a municipally-owned theater for a controversial
play.'8 5 In these cases the Court has reasoned that discrimination in
providing forums for speakers whose message falls within the First
Amendment is, in essence, impermissible censorship. Yet the Court in
Maher did not rely upon this type of analysis.
In sum, the Maher distinction between unrelated privileges and
enabling privileges lacks support from the Shapiro and Maricopa decisions. In those cases the Court similarly addressed laws which placed
unconstitutional conditions upon the receipt of welfare benefits. The
language of these two cases emphasizes comparative hardship and deterrence in determining whether the discriminatory grant of a privilege
constitutes an impingement.
Furthermore, the logic of Maher's distinction runs contrary to
First Amendment decisions prohibiting discrimination in providing the
means to exercise the right of free speech.
This does not, however, address the Court's argument that the
abortion right as defined by Roe v. Wade does not extend beyond the
option of a woman to seek an abortion at private expense.' 8 6 That argument goes to the question of the special nature of the abortion right.
piro and Maricopa County did not hold that States would penalize the right to travel inter-

state by refusing to pay the bus fares of the indigent travelers." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at
474-75 n.8.
184. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). See also, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379

U.S. 536 (1965) (statute allowing "unbridled discretion" of city officials to allow or disallow
street assemblies and parades struck down as an unconstitutional infringement of First

Amendment rights).
185. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
186. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473-77.
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The present section is intended to deal only with the standard of impingement in indirect burden analyses. For this reason, discussion of
the abortion right issue is reserved for the next section of this note. No
such deferral is dictated in fully analyzing the penalty concept in
Hayes. The Court's justification in that case rests entirely upon what
constitutes an impinging penalty, not upon any claim that the rights
involved in Hayes were unusually narrow.
In Hayes, the Court distinguished between the state policies in
Jackson and Perry which were found to unconstitutionally penalize
rights, and the plea bargaining situation examined in Hayes. In the
former cases the disadvantage placed upon the defendant for exercising
his rights was unilaterally imposed upon him by statute, or by decisions
in which the defendant or his counsel did not participate. In contrast,
the disadvantage suffered by Hayes for electing a jury trial came about
through a bilateral bargaining process. 87 As in Maher the emphasis is
on the form the disadvantage suffered for exercising a right takes rather
than the weight and reality of disadvantage. Unlike Maher, however,
there is no question of the state being obligated to supply a defendant
an enabling privilege so that he may exercise his rights to plead not
guilty and demand a jury trial. 88 Furthermore, an increased sentence
based upon the exercise of these rights is, under prior case law, the type
of hardship which may serve as an infringing penalty and which must
be justified by a strong legitimate interest to be held constitutional.' 8 9
The underlying issue in Hayes is this: given that it is generally an
infringement for the state to place a hardship upon a defendant for
exercising rights by way of an increased prison sentence, may the state
impose this identical hardship upon a defendant, if the decision to do
so is arrived at by prosecutorial discretion in a bargaining process?
Thus posed, the question virtually answers itself. If, as Jackson
holds, unilateral state action increasing a defendant's punishment must
be justified by a strong state interest, then a deliberate decision by a
state agent achieving an identical result should not avoid the necessity
of having to be so justified merely because it is cloaked by a bargaining
process. Otherwise, a prosecutor could easily transform any decision to
punish a defendant for exercising a trial or appeal right into a constitu187. "In [Pearce and Perry] the Court was dealing with the State's unilateral imposition
of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his original
conviction-a situation 'very different from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining between the prosecution and the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power.'" 434 U.S. at 362 (citing with approval Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790, 809 (1969)).
188. A lenient prison sentence for a given criminal conduct is not the means to exercise
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, unlike the case of Medicaid and abortion. See note 183
and accompanying text supra.
189. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).

Fall 1979]

RESURRECTION OF RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION

197

tionally permissible action merely by doing a bit of "bargaining" with a
defendant before the defendant fully exercises the right.
The contrary conclusion reached by the Hayes majority, however,
leads to the anomalous result that no penalty is involved where the very
sanction suffered by the uncooperative defendant is the deliberate imposition by the state of an increased sentence for the express reason
that the defendant refused to waive constitutional rights. The illogic of
this viewpoint was assailed in the dissent of Justice Blackmun:
I perceive little difference between vindictiveness after what the
Court describes. . . as the exercise of a "legal right to attack his
original conviction," and vindictiveness in the "give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining." Prosecutorial vindictiveness in any context is still prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Due
Process Clause should protect an accused against it, however it
asserts itself.' 90
Except for the fact that in Hayes the increased sentence was the result
of personal discretion and a bilateral bargaining process rather than the
operation of law, the situation is indistinguishable from that of Jackson. In Jackson, the defendant was expressly guaranteed by statute
that he would escape the death penalty if he waived a jury trial. If
anything, the situation in Hayes should be considered a greater infringement of rights because there the prosecutor expressly conditioned
the lighter sentence upon a waiver of any trial before jury or judge.
The Hayes result, by allowing a state to accomplish through the
discretion of its agents that which it is constitutionally prohibited from
doing by statute, is no more than an elevation of form over substance.' 9' As Justice
Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in
192
Furman v. Georgia:
A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000 would
be exempt from the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a
law that in terms said that blacks, those who never went beyond
the fifth grade in school, those who made less than $3,000 a year,
or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the only people executed. A law which in the overall view reaches that result
in practice has no
more sanctity than a law which in terms pro193
vides the same.
In conclusion, the standard for determining impingement of-a
right by an indirect burden utilized by the Burger Court in Maher and
Hayes represents a significant break with precedent. Prior indirect
burden cases found impingement if the conditions set by the state on a
190. 434 U.S. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191. This has been repeatedly denounced. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,

614 (1971); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531-36 (1971).
192. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty ruled unconstitutional as applied).
193. Id. at 256 (Douglas J., concurring).
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privilege significantly deterred the exercise of the right or served to penalize the right by visiting comparative hardship on exercisers of the
right vis-A-vis non-exercisers. These two recent decisions appear to
have discarded the deterrence prong and have narrowly construed the
test of penalty to refer only to instances where hardship comes about
through a mechanism which satisfies some conceptual form of penalty.
The effect of such a narrowly defined standard is, of course, to remove
many of the teeth of indirect burden analysis and/or provide the Court
with virtually free-floating discretion in determining these cases.
In the next section, this note will discuss a second weakness of
Maher, namely, its narrowed interpretation of the scope of the abortion
right.
C. The Maher Distinction Between Qualified and Unqualified Rights
In Maher v. Roe, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, states
that the abortion right defined in Roe v. Wade' 9 4 is not an unqualified
constitutional right but rather one which protects a woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy.' 9 5 As a qualified right, it imposes no obliga96
tion of neutrality upon the state in distributing an enabling privilege. 1
The opinion implied in a footnote that such an obligation of neutrality
might exist as to the distribution of an unrelated privilege, such as general welfare benefits to a woman who had chosen to have an abortion.
on the
Denial of this latter type of privilege would constitute a penalty
exercise of the abortion right, and Shapiro v. Thompson 197 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County'9 8 would control. " '
The effect of drawing such a distinction between qualified and unqualified rights is that a state is thereby allowed to discriminate in the
distribution of an enabling benefit. Perceiving the Roe v. Wade right as
that of a pregnant woman to choose between childbirth or abortion, the
qualified nature of this right permits the government to distribute funds
in a non-neutral manner, that is, to those women favoring childbirth. 20 0
In contrast, recognizing the right of free speech, for example, as an unqualified right, such discrimination would be impermissible; if the government provided the enabling privilege of a forum for speech in
general, it could not do so discriminatorily so as to favor one choice of
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

195. 432 U.S. at 473-74.
196. Id See notes 119-21 and accompanying text supra.
197. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
198. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).

199. 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. See notes 122 and 183 and accompanying text supra.
200. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 469 n.5.
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speech over another. 20 ' This constricted view of the scope of the abortion right is, of course, critical to the Maher result.
In analyzing the validity of this unqualified right distinction it
would be appropriate to begin with the two rather venerable cases that
Justice Powell cites in its support: Meyer v. Nebraska20 2 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.2°0 Both cases were decided in the mid-1920's under
a judicial philosophy favoring the broad use of the substantive due
process theory to scrutinize legislation. In essence, this theory was that
a judicially recognized liberty could "not be interfered with

. . .

by

legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State to effect." 2° Protected rights not explicit in the Constitution were deemed by the Court
to be implicit in the term "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause and included the economic freedoms to work and to
contract. 20 5 The significance of the Meyer and Pierce decisions was
that they added a non-economic, civil liberty component to the already
existing economic liberties.
In Meyer the Court ruled unconstitutional a Nebraska statute
which made it a misdemeanor to teach a foreign language in a public
or private school to any pre-eighth grade child. The admitted purpose
of the legislation was "to promote civic development by inhibiting
training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals
before they could learn English and acquire American ideals. 20 6 This
prohibition was found to interfere with the freedom "to acquire useful
knowledge" and to "bring up [one's] children. '207 The Court held this
infringement to be unjustified since the motive of fostering "a homogeneous people" was not a legitimate end.208 In Pierce the issue was
whether the state of Oregon could require all children to attend public
school, thus foreclosing the option of parents to send their children to
private schools. Applying a similar line of reasoning, the Court held
that the law unreasonably interfered with the liberty set out in Meyer
of parents "to direct the upbringing and education" of their children.20 9
201. See notes 184-85 and accompanying text supra.
Similarly, if the state provides a benefit which aids religious exercise the aid may not
favor one religion over another. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50
(1971) (conscientious objector exemption from military service); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (property tax exemption for religious organizations).
202. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
203. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
204. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
205. Id. at 399. See, e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
206. 262 U.S. at 401.
207. Id. at 399-401.
208. Id. at 402-03.
209. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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The Supreme Court has strongly renounced the use of substantive
due process to protect economic freedoms.2" ' On the other hand,
Meyer and Pierce, which added protection to personal rights, stand as
viable precedents today. Modern decisions have read the two cases as
indicating support for the recognition of personal freedoms not expressly mentioned in the Constitution but which are nevertheless "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and constitutionally
protected. 21 ' Thus Roe v. Wade had utilized the two cases as supporting "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy [which] does exist under the Constitution. 2 12
In the Maher v. Roe opinion, Meyer and Pierce are cited in support of the proposition that the presence of an abortion right as an implied liberty does not insure protection against the disfavored treatment
of women seeking an abortion when the state distributes the enabling
privilege of Medicaid.
[Neither Meyer nor Pierce] denied to a State the policy choice of
encouraging the preferred course of action. Indeed, in Meyer the
Court was careful to state that the power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" that included English and excluded German
in its free public schools "is not questioned. 2 13
This interpretation of Meyer and Pierce-as allowing the state, in
bestowing educational benefits, to discriminate against the exercise of
implied liberties-is most likely historically correct.2" 4 It is consistent
with such pre-1952 cases as Davis v. Massachusetts,1 which held that a
city may discriminate against an unpopular preacher in granting the
privilege to use a public park as a forum, Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 2 16 which held that a state may grant the privilege of a university
education, in such a way as to discriminate against Methodists practicing their religious tenet of pacifism, and In re Summers,2 17 in which the
Court decided that the state of Illinois might properly refuse a religious
210. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
211. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
212. 410 U.S. at 152.
213. 432 U.S. at 476-77.
214. But see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), in which the Court held that a public school rule prohibiting students from
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War violated the right of free speech.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) was relied on extensively in Tinker as supporting
the conclusion that the state could not determine public school policy on the basis of the
illegitimate motive of fostering "a homogeneous people." 393 U.S. at 506-07, 511-12 (emphasis added).
215. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
216. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
217. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
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pacifist admission to the state bar for reasons of his beliefs. Indeed, by
so interpreting Meyer and Piercein Maher v. Roe, Justice Powell seems
to have resurrected the right-privilege distinction recognized in this line
of cases.
There is, however, nothing in the right-privilege distinction concept to support the fine-tuned distinction between qualified and unqualified rights made in Maher. As previously discussed,2 18 the rightprivilege distinction applied to any government benefit and recognized
no distinction between enabling privileges" 9 and unrelated privileges. 220 Nor did the right-privilege distinction apply only to Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests as Maher implies. It imposed no
obligation of neutrality on the governmental distribution of privileges
even when discrimination was present against unpopular speakers and
disfavored religious minorities whose conduct came within the express
protections of the First Amendment.
Thus, the dicta appropriated by Justice Powell from the Meyer
and Pierce decisions does not represent any considered assessment by
those Courts that liberties protected under the Fourteenth Amendment
should only restrain state interference with private activity. Rather, if
such a concept is to be found in the language of Meyer and Pierce it
amounts to no more than a restatement of the right-privilege distinction's application that government may, without restriction, place unconstitutional conditions on the granting of a privilege.
The Maher opinion further reasoned that a more far-reaching
treatment of the Meyer-Pierce liberty of parental upbringing would
lead to the problematic conclusion that state decisions to fund public
but not private education or choices as to school curriculum would be
subjected to a compelling state interest test.
Yet, were we to accept appellees' argument, an indigent parent
could challenge the state policy of favoring public rather than
private schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced
here. We think it abundantly clear that a State is not required to
show a compelling interest for its policy choice to favor normal
childbirth any more than a State must22 so justify its election to
fund public but not private education. '
In fact the unseemliness of the proposition that state choices in
these situations require extraordinary justification suggests, by itself,
that strong interests are present for allowing states to resolve these
questions in a relatively unhampered manner. A state's decision to
218. See notes 11-28 and accompanying text supra.
219. See, e.g., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
220. See, e.g., In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293
U.S. 245 (1934).
221. 432 U.S. at 477.
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fund only public education, or to provide some curriculum subjects
rather than others, is dictated by (1) its interest in providing certain
minimal educational needs of its citizens, and (2) finite resources of
money, teachers and classroom space. A constitutional mandate requiring that allotments to public education be matched by state subsidies to private education, or that public schools provide a curriculum in
all desired subjects would, of course, avoid infringing the right of parents to direct the education of their children. At the same time, however, it would place an impossible financial burden upon a state's
educational efforts, and frustrate the compelling interest a state has in
making an education freely available to its children.
In the view of this author, it seems appropriate in the case of public outlays for education, and analogous situations where the non-neutral distribution of privileges with respect to affected rights would
create an impossible state burden, that a somewhat modified compelling interest standard be used-one which allows the government to
make the practical decisions which it must make, but which also recognizes that unconstitutional conditions placed upon privileges do serve
to burden and chill the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
The compelling state interest test should be deemed fulfilled if there is
(1) a compelling state interest in granting a privilege, and this interest
by its nature necessitates that choices be made in the nature of an unconstitutional condition, and (2) a choice based upon constitutionally
legitimate grounds, not upon a governmental desire to discourage or
disfavor the exercise of the discriminated-against constitutional rights.
Under this analysis, suppose the Meyer-Pierce liberty were recognized as "unqualified," thereby imposing an obligation of neutrality on
a state in alloting the enabling privilege of educational resources. No
constitutional straitjacket would be entailed so as to obligate the state
to fund private education if it chose to fund public schooling or to fund
every desired foreign language if it provided instruction in any. For
example, a school's choice to teach French rather than German may be
said to impinge somewhat upon the liberty of any parents who wish
their children to learn German. Such an impingement could be justified, however, by a compelling state interest in providing education to
its children, which interest, in order to be achieved, necessitates that
some curriculum choices be sacrificed, and by the fact that the choice
was based on a constitutionally legitimate motive, such as higher student demand, or greater social utility of French. But a decision made
on the basis of a desire to discourage the learning of German or to
retard the development of German culture should not receive constitutional protection. This framework, in which the compelling interest
test is confronted and passed, seems far preferable to that suggested by
Maher as to the scope of the Meyer-Pierce liberty. If this liberty offered no protection in the public school sector, as Justice Powell sug-
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gests, a law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language in any public
grammar or high school, enacted for the purpose of "inhibiting training
and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals" in order
to foster "a homogeneous people" would not be constitutionally suspect. 222 Such a result, while perhaps acceptable in 1923 to the Meyer

Court which was locked into the right-privilege distinction, is highly
questionable in 1977.223 In sum, there is nothing in the Meyer and
Pierce decisions nor in the logical implications of the liberties they define to justify the unqualified right distinction made in Maher. Furthermore, if the unqualified right distinction in Maher v. _Roe is thus
based upon a myopic view of a discredited doctrine, it is perhaps to be
viewed with some suspicion.
Contrasting the situation of state choice in public education with
the situation in Maher, there is no simliar cost-effective reason for the
state to fund childbirth but not abortions. Hospitals are not classrooms
where one single operation is most efficiently provided to thirty patients
simultaneously, and there is no strong reason why any choice must be
made by the state.
A better analogy may be drawn to Sherbert v. Verner 224 and Shapiro v. Thompson.22 5 In Maher, as in Sherbert and Shapiro, any cost

savings arose from cutting a relatively small segment of the population
out of a general distribution of benefits. The non-funding of elective
abortions created a specific exception to a Medicaid budget which in-

cluded funds for childbirth as well as a broad spectrum of other medi222. Since the act of electing to not teach German, under Justice Powell's view, "is not
questioned," the motives of the legislators is not to be scrutinized. This result is dictated by
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which, despite strong evidence that public
swimming pools were closed in order to avoid their racial integration, that conduct was held
constitutional (see note 6 supra). Since the state action on its face impinged no right, it
required no justification by a legitimate state interest.
The argument set forth in the text would hold that a withholding of curriculum should
be dictated by proper state motives. Where the motive for such action is to encourage the
forgoing of the right to pursue desired subjects of knowledge, the policy should be struck.
Education involves constitutional interests not found in the case of swimming pools. Cf.
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (1976) (removal of book from
school library held unconstitutional "[i]n the absence of any explanation which is neutral in
First Amendment terms." Id. at 582).
223. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) is not apposite. (See Maher, 432 U.S. at
477). Nonvood dealt specifically with a class action suit to enjoin a state from loaning stateowned textbooks to children in racially segregated schools. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade any significant grant of state aid to schools which discriminate
on the basis of race. 413 U.S. at 466-67. Private schools which did not discriminate might
continue to receive textbook loans. Id. at 471. This holding-that states may not aid private
education if such aid directly furthers racial discrimination-is hardly strong support for the
proposition that state discretion with regard to public educational policy is unbounded.
224. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
225. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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cal services, just as the recent immigrant in Shapiro and the Saturday
worshipper in Sherbert found themselves singled out, solely on the basis of exercising a right, from widely dispersed programs of benefits. It
was precisely to prevent government from making those citizens who
exercised a constitutional right the narrow exception to a general policy
granting privileges and benefits that provided the motive for a prohibition of unconstitutional conditions. 2 6 Yet, this point is entirely missed
by the Maher opinion.
Maher, by its conceptualization of the abortion right as "qualified," creates an unjustified exception to the rule that unconstitutional
conditions placed on a privilege impinge upon the affected right. It
fails to address the underlying concerns that triggered close judicial
scrutiny of such conditions. Government should not be allowed to use
its manipulative power to grant privileges in order to buy off the exercise of rights or to discriminate against those exercisng unpopular
rights. When the government does grant a privilege to which is attached an unconstitutional condition, the condition should be justified
by a strong interest other than a dislike for the exercise of a right.
There may be some situations where requiring the government to
equally benefit all constitutionally permissible options is too burdensome and would frustrate a strong and legitimate interest in making
some grant. This is particularly true in the case of such enabling benefits as education outlays. Here the unconstitutional conditions rationale would be satisfied by requiring a strong governmental purpose
behind the privilege grant which necessitates choice, and requiring that
the choice made be on the basis of some legitimate grounds. The shortcoming of the unqualified right distinction is that it allows government
to discriminate unjustifiably against disfavored rights.
Although the Maher and Hayes decisions arrive at their respective
results through different analyses, both achieve a similar end-producta refusal to find a constitutional violation in the case of an unconstitutional condition. Maher does this by narrowly construing the right involved. The abortion right is held not to extend to governmental
distributions which would enable the right to be exercised. Hence,
there is no penalty present when there is discrimination against the
abortion right in this arena. Maher leaves open the question of what
other rights are to be similarly construed. The Hayes Court does not in
any way constrict the rights to plead not guilty and elect a jury trial.
Instead, as discussed earlier, Hayes narrowly construed the term "penalty" in order to find no impingement or vindictiveness present--even
where a defendant suffers an increased punishment expressly for asserting these rights.
The unqualified right distinction made in Maher to avoid the find226. See notes 106-108 and accompanying text supra.
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ing of an unconstitutional condition is justified neither by logic nor precedent. As indicated in Part I, the application of the right-privilege
distinction so as to permit government unqualified discretion to distribute privileges in such a way as to discriminate against unpopular
constitutional rights has been thoroughly discredited. The nature of

the statute examined in Maher presented no reason for the Court to
deviate from its standard approach to unconstitutional conditions.
Such conditions should be allowed to stand only when they promote

strong, legitimate state interests. The next section examines treatment
of the state interest issue in Maher and Hayes.
D. The State Purposes Behind the Policies in Maher and Hayes
In both Maher and Hayes, the majority opinions either ignore or
gloss over the holdings of Jackson, Shapiro,Pearce and Chaffin that "if
the only objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of
constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "227 The Maher
opinion merely states that the state has "a strong and legitimate interest
in encouraging normal childbirth. '22 In Hayes, the Court is more direct: "this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate
is
the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table
2 29
to persuade the defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty."
The Maher opinion relied on language in Roe v. Wade230 indicating a recognizable interest of the state in the potential life of the fetus.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong interest in
protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest exists
throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality as the woman approaches term." . . . Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, she "cannot be isolated in her
privacy... . [Her] privacy is no longer sole and any right of
privacy s possesses must be measured accordingly.
Because of its interest in protecting the fetus, the state, Maher indicates,
may correspondingly have a legitimate preference for childbirth over
abortion, and on the basis of this interest, implement policy "encourag227. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 n.20 (1973); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 581 (1968).
228. 432 U.S. at 478 quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977). It should, perhaps,

be emphasized that what is at issue in Maher is not the purpose for Medicaid funding for
childbirth generally, but rather, the purpose for the discriminatory classification between
women desiring childbirth and those choosing abortion. 432 U.S. at 470. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582.
229. 434 U.S. at 364.
230. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
231. 432 U.S. at 478 (citations omitted).
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ing the preferred course of action." '3 2 In other words, the state may
encourage women to choose childbirth and thus forgo abortion.
This approach is not consistent with the holding of Roe v. Wade
that the interest of the state in the fetus is recognized as compelling
only after the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy. 233 Until
this state interest is compelling, it may not, under Roe, justify interference with the constitutional right of the pregnant woman to choose
abortion. 34 Stripped of the opinion's sophistical treatment of the scope
of the abortion right and interpretation as to what amounts to a penalty
thereon, the Maher Court is asserting the somewhat illogical proposition that a state interest in childbirth, found in Roe v. Wade to be insufficient to justify actions to prevent the exercise of the abortion right, is
nevertheless sufficient to justify a discrimination made for thepurpose
of discouragingits exercise. Beyond mere logical difficulties, however,
is the rather radical proposition that any state action might find constitutional justification in a purpose of discouraging the exercise of a
right.
In examining a second interest put forth to justify the discrimination upheld in Maher, namely fiscal savings, it would be appropriate to
reconsider one of the points made by Justice Harlan in his Shapiro v.
Thompson dissent.2 35 He argued that a rule requiring a state to eliminate any unconstitutional conditions from a benefit grant might prove
so burdensome that it would cause a state to refrain from granting benefits it would otherwise provide on the basis of laudable motives.
Justice Harlan utilized the example of a state wishing to provide
an extremely generous welfare program to its indigent residents. He
reasoned that the state should be permitted to utilize a residency requirement to keep the cost of this program within manageable bounds,
that is, to prevent a mass influx of poor from less charitable states, immigrating for the purpose of obtaining these benefits. 236 The majority
opinion in Shapiro, by requiring a compelling state interest to justify
the unconstitutional condition of a residency requirement,23 7 and by
holding that fiscal interest alone could not constitute such an interest, 238 would seem to lock the state into a choice of providing either an
overly burdensome program or one no more attractive than its neighbors'-with obvious results. Justice Harlan's solution was to utilize a
less stringent balancing test rather than the compelling state interest
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 477.
410 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 163-64; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
Id. at 674-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 633.

Fall 1979]

RESURRECTION OF RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION

207

test in evaluating an indirect burden upon the right to travel.2" Such a
less exacting standard was justified in cases involving non-explicit
rights, since, because of the number and diversity of these rights, extension of the "compelling interest rule to all cases in which such rights are
affected would go far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.' "240 In balancing the state interests in favor of the residency requirement against the resulting burden on the right to travel, Harlan
would have discounted the burden due to its indirect nature24 ' weighed
against the state's interest, among others, in discouraging those who
would travel to a state in order to collect welfare benefits.2 4 2
Harlan's suggestion that a compelling state interest test is imprqper
for non-explicit rights has not been followed by the Court. Several of
these rights have been deemed fundamental and subject to interference
only when a compelling interest is present.2 43
While Harlan recognized as legitimate a state's interest in keeping
out indigents, recognition of this interest is not critical to an evaluation
of the problem posed by his example. The two cognizable interests involved are a desire to provide indigent residents with a highly competitive welfare level as compared with that provided by other states, and a
desire to keep the overall costs of this benefit program within bounds.
These two interests, taken together with economic and social realities,
dictate that the state has a corollary interest in shielding its treasury
vaults from incoming poor. Only the first two, real interests of the
state, should be weighed in determining if the state has justified its impingement on the travel right. Thus, the thrust of Justice Harlan's example is to be understood not as challenging the majority's failure to
allow for a legitimate state interest in discouraging indigents to exercise
their right of travel, but rather, as being critical of the Shapiro opinion
for not adequately permitting the fulfillment of state interests necessitating choice.
Justice Harlan's concern that over-rigorous judicial scrutiny of unconstitutional conditions may fiscally overburden a state'sproposed extension of a benefit program is reflected in the logic of the Maher
decision. 2 " Harlan's suggestion was to utilize a balancing, rather than
compelling interest, test to evaluate these conditions indirectly burdening the exercise of rights. The Maher Court seems willing to leave intact a compelling state interest requirement if the affected right is
239.
240.
241.
242.

See note 96 supra.
394 U.S. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

243. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974) (travel); Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 163 (1972) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (contraception).
244. See notes 221-23 and accompanying text supra.
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unrelated to the benefit conferred, reasoning that in such cases the condition acts as a penalty. But, if it is an enabling benefit, as in the case of
financing German in public schools or providing Medicaid for abortion, the condition may be justified by no more than a purported state
interest in a citizen's forgoing the exercise of the involved right, and in
the fiscal savings which almost
invariably results from cutting any
245
group out of a benefit grant.
Maher clearly goes too far in solving this "problem." To say that
government may have a legitimate interest in citizens forgoing their
rights drastically depreciates the value that those rights should have in
a constitutional system. Government should not be permitted to deliberately shape its welfare programs for the purpose of rewarding those
willing to forgo unpopular rights.
In the prior section, discussing Justice Powell's school curriculum
hypothetical in Maher, this note suggested that the distinguishing feature of such a case lay not in the nature of the right involved nor in the
classification of the privilege extended as enabling or unrelated.
Rather, what differentiated curriculum choice from traditional unconstitutional condition cases was that the state interest behind the privilege advanced was one which necessitated choice to be achieved.
Justice Harlan's generous welfare program example is similarly a case
where the state interest involved cannot practically be achieved without
a choice being made which cuts out a class of citizens on the basis of
their exercise of a constitutional right, that is, unless the state is able to
impose the unconstitutional condition of a residency requirement, its
end of providing a high welfare grant may be too expensive to be feasible. The proper distinction to be made is between unconstitutional
conditions imposed in situations where the reasonfor the grantingofthe
privilege is a legitimate state interest necessitating choice and situations
where this is not the case. In the later type of situation there is no
reason not to apply a standard unconstitutional condition analysis and
strike the condition unless there is a compelling legitimate reason for
the discrimination.
The remaining question is what type of test should govern a case
where the interest in granting a privilege would be frustrated if a state
were not permitted to utilize an unconstitutional condition to limit the
grant. Actually, this is an open question, the Supreme Court having
never faced such a case, but it is, of course, the problem presented by
the hypotheticals of Justice Powell in Maher and Justice Harlan in his
Shapiro dissent. The argument could be made that Justice Harlan's
balancing test should be appropriate in such circumstances. It is better,
245. "Our cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choosing among
competing demands for limited public funds," 432 U.S. at 479. See also id. at 481 (Burger,
J., concurring).
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perhaps, for a state to grant a privilege discriminatorily than not at all.
Such a tolerance of unconstitutional conditions, however, does not adequately take into consideration the adverse impact that these conditions
may have upon the exercise of rights. First, under the standard analysis an unconstitutional condition will not receive constitutional scrutiny
at all unless the relative detriment or the deterrent effect upon citizens
seeking to exercise a right is meaningful. Second, the practical result of
many unconstitutional conditions has been effectively to foreclose the
exercise of rights to that segment of citizenry subject to the conditional
grant. Since the adverse effect of an unconstitutional condition upon
the exercise of a right will very likely be substantial, albeit indirect, the
compelling interest standard seems most appropriate.
For instance, in Justice Harlan's example, a state's interest in experimenting with a generous welfare program does not appear to justify
the imposition of a one year residency requirement. The effect of the
unconstitutional condition will be, practically, to deny poor persons the
freedom to migrate to that state. If, on the other hand, the state maintains a welfare subsidy relatively equivalent to that of its neighbors, it
has no reason to fear a massive influx of indigents or to impose a prohibitive residency requirement. Hence the interest in welfare experimentation is not so compelling as to justify the burden upon the right
of travel. In the case of educational curriculum, the state's interest in
educating the young is compelling and would, of course, outweigh the
impinging effect that curriculum choice has upon the right defined in
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. In sum, the compelling state interest test should be appropriate in any unconstitutional
condition case. The condition should be allowed to stand only if there
is a compelling interest for granting the privilege that would be frustrated if the condition did not limit the expense of the grant, or if there
is a compelling interest for the discrimination.
The facts of Maher give no indication that funding a Medicaid
program that discriminated against women wishing abortion would be
significantly less expensive to a state than providing a program free of
discrimination. In fact, the district court was convinced that a nondiscriminatory program might be less expensive overall.
This [fiscal] interest is wholly chimerical because abortion is the
least expensive medical response to a pregnancy. . . . Furthermore, the birth of a child to a welfare mother increases the burden on the state's welfare coffers because the newly-born indigent
child will, in all likelihood, qualify for state welfare assistance.
The state's assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay
the cost of a welfare
mother's abortion is simply contrary to un24 6
disputed facts.
246. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. at 664; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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Since the exclusion of elective abortion from Connecticut's program
burdened the abortion right without achieving any demonstrable legitimate state purpose, (beyond, perhaps, marginal savings attributable to
an invidious classification), the regulation in Maher should have been
struck down.
In Hayes the Court takes one step beyond Maher by expressly
stating what Maher implied: it classified as "constitutionally legitimate" a state's interest in persuading a citizen "to forgo" the exercise of
a right.24 7 This language is only dicta, since by holding that the prosecutor's action failed to impinge upon any right of Hayes,24 8 the Court
eliminated the need for state justification.
A proper analysis would have first admitted that under the standards of Jackson and Pearceconstitutional rights were in fact infringed
by the prosecutor's actions in Hayes. It would have then been necessary for the Court to examine whether a compelling state interest existed either for plea bargaining in general, or at least for the particular
practice of reindictment utilized in the case of Hayes. The privilege
involved in Hayes was of a somewhat different type then the Medicaid
benefits in Maher in that a state does not incur an economic cost in
providing the privilege of a lenient sentence. Hence, no contention
could be made that the interest in granting the privilege necessitated
choice. What should have been subject to more probing scrutiny was
the interest of the state in its discrimination; its offering Hayes a severe
sentence if he did not waive his rights versus a lighter one if he was
willing to do so.
The Court's assertion in both Maher and Hayes that the policies
involved were justified by legitimate state interests in citizens forgoing
rights is a substantial and unwarranted departure from precedent. The
government should never be permitted to act solely on the basis of its
dislike for any constitutionally protected right. The seed of a doctrine
that would recognize such interests can only be described as constitutionally hazardous. It deserves to be reexamined and discarded.

IV.

The Implications of Maher and Hayes

The practical effect of a continued movement of the Court in the
directions set out in Maher and Hayes will be to set back much of the
progress made in the last two and a half decades against unconstitutional conditions. Faithful adherence to a standard of impingement
which considered whether a condition served to deter the exercise of
247. See note 157 and accompanying text supra.
248. See notes 155-56 and accompanying text supra.
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rights, and whether it caused relative hardship to those exercising them,
would, of course, reach every unconstitutional condition which significantly disfavored a right. In Maher and Hayes the Court showed a
willingness to back away from- such a standard, indicating that real
substantive impact upon a right was not co-extensive with a finding of
impingement. In both Maher and Hayes the government had made the
waiver of constitutional rights the price for privileges of great importance to the potential recipients. In neither case was this action found
to burden any constitutional guarantee so as to require some meaningful justification for the condition.
The unqualified right distinction made in Maher, is, in essence, a
partial resurrection of the right-privilege distinction. A woman has a
right to choose an abortion but a state may discriminate against the
exercise of this right in distributing privileges-so long as the discrimination is not so "analogous to a criminal fine" as to constitute a "penalty." Utilizing this distinction the Court might create a class for rights
deemed to have a limited scope. Such rights would receive the same
protection as other rights when exercised at private expense, but would
be only narrowly guarded against infringement by unconstitutional
conditions on privileges. The Court has yet to categorize which rights
should fall into this class, or indicate whether the concept will be used
extensively beyond abortion cases. Maher alone might lead one to conclude that the "penalty" concept is important only where rights which
are not unqualified are involved. Such rights are protected only against
unconstitutional conditions which are penalties. On the other hand, an
unqualified right might be held infringed whenever a state substantially
discriminates against a citizen exercising it.
The Hayes decision dispells such a notion, however. It indicates
that the narrowed penalty concept, relegated to a footnote in Maher,
may become of paramount importance in unconstitutional condition
cases, effectively superseding the unqualified right distinction that the
Maher decision seems to turn on. The Hayes Court did not indicate
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to plead not guilty and have
a jury trial, or the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process
were in any way limited or qualified rights. Yet by use of the penalty
concept these rights were held not to be impinged by a condition which
visited severe disadvantage on one utilizing them. The Hayes analysis
thus seems to be more applicable to unconstitutional condition questions affecting rights in general than does that in Maher.
The question remains as to which rights will be examined under
this emerging standard. Cases involving First Amendment freedoms
may be immune from a Maher-Hayes analysis since the establishment
clause expressly proscribes government discrimination in matters of re-
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ligion,24 9 and because of the emphasis past cases have placed upon government neutrality in matters of politics and speech. ° This note
suggests that conditions discouraging and adversely discriminating
against citizens exercising First Amendment rights will probably continue to receive rigorous scrutiny and require strong justification regardless of the form such conditions take.2 5 ' Other rights, however,
seem destined for more narrow unconstitutional condition protection.
The idea of penalty whch runs through Maher and Hayes is an
amorphous one. In Maher the condition attached to Medicaid was not
a penalty because the privilege involved was an enabling privilege,
rather than an unrelated privilege. In Hayes the condition placed upon
a lenient sentence was deemed not to be a penalty because it arose from
a bargaining process. The term "penalty" thus seems to have evolved
into a form of smoke screen behind which the Court may make a nonstandardized decision as to whether it wishes to find infringement. In
actuality, the members of the Court seem to be responding to unarticulated political or social concerns, or on the basis of intuitive notionsand then simply announcing that the unconstitutional condition in
question is not a penalty. The fact that the Court now finds nothing
wrong in the state acting for the sole purpose of discouraging the assertion of a right only increases this free-floating discretion.
Any standard which emphasizes form over substance is unlikely to
cure the ill to which it is addressed. The various approaches developed
by the Warren Court were well addressed to rooting out unconstitutional conditions which had real and substantial negative effect upon
the exercise of rights, and requiring that such conditions be justified by
strong state concerns other than a mere dislike for these rights. If the
present Court continues to frame the question as to whether an unconstitutional condition takes the form of a penalty, some conditions which
in fact have substantial impact upon a right will be only minimally
scrutinized. The fact situations in Maher and Hayes are extreme illustrations of the tremendous pressure that government is capable of
utilizing in the distribution of privileges so as to discourage the exercise
of unpopular rights. In the case of Medicaid, state and federal governments, based upon evolving standards of humanitarian concern, have
decided that needy members of society should not be forced to do without adequate medical treatment. Yet the Maher decision permits a
state selectively to utilize non-provision of medical treatment, an alternative which society generally finds inhumane and unacceptable, so as
249. Maher, 432 U.S. at 464 n.8.
250. See text accompanying notes 184 & 185 supra.
251. Cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating state statute disqualifying
minister from becoming delegate to state constitutional convention); Elrod v. Bums, 427

U.S. 347 (1976) (patronage policy of dismissing county employees belonging to losing political party violated First Amendment right of association).
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to coerce indigent women to forgo their constitutional right to choose
abortion. Undoubtedly, a great many indigent pregnant women who
desire abortions will, not only in response to financial pressure, but also
out of a concern for their physical health and well-being, be forced to
take what the Maher opinion refers to as "the preferred course of action" and forgo abortions. The pressure involved in Hayes was similarly inescapable. There the state was permitted to exercise the threat
of a substantive hardship of its own making and under its exclusive
control, namely, a severe prison sentence, to attempt to induce a defendant to forgo his valuable constitutional rights to contest his guilt
before a jury.
Yet in neither case was the state required to come forth with a
strong or compelling justification. It is suggested that when government uses its power to grant privileges so as to greatly disfavor the
exercise of particular constitutional rights, as in these two cases, government should be required to show strong justification for its policies.
The extension of a governmental privilege is a response to a socially perceived need. The purpose of eroding the right-privilege distinction was to force government to respond to those needs in a manner
that did not discriminate against individuals exercising constitutional
rights; the State was given the choice between a constitutionally benign
distribution of a privilege or no distribution at all. The new direction
of the Court taken in these two recent unconstitutional condition cases
will tend to shield government from such a choice. Due to the Court's
"unqualified" right distinction which may limit the reach of a right, or
the Court's newly narrowed concept of what constitutes a penalizing
impingement, some privileges conditioned on the waiver of rights will
not receive significant judicial scrutiny. If a state wishes to discourage
the assertions of certain rights it need only utilize some discretion as to
method and hope that the Supreme Court will approve. Maher and
Hayes in effect partially recreated the right-privilege distinction. There
is no right to a governmentally-granted privilege, and government may
therefore grant a privilege on whatever terms it chooses; so long as the
condition does not take the form of a penalty, a privilege may be conditioned on the waiver of a constitutional right.
Conclusion
The Alaher v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes decisions represent
a significant shift of the Supreme Court's direction in cases involving
unconstitutional conditions placed upon governmentally granted privileges and benefits.
Through the first half of the twentieth century such cases had generally been analyzed under the philosophical constructs of the rightprivilege distinction. That which was only a privilege was not constitu-
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tionally protected and might be conditioned in any manner that a
bountiful government saw fit-including upon the waiver of constitutional rights.
In the Warren Era, the Court began to adopt a less tolerant attitude toward such conditions, perceiving that government, which was
forbidden from directly preventing and punishing the exercise of rights,
should not be allowed to use its unlimited ability to grant privileges in
order to accomplish these forbidden results indirectly. Under a variety
of approaches, conditions creating a negative impact upon the exercise
of a constitutional right were subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny.
Whether the impact was sufficiently negative was determined on the
basis of two criteria: first, whether it served to deter exercise of the
right; and second, whether it placed relative hardship and disadvantage
upon individuals exercising the right solely because of this exercise.
Conditions significantly having these effects were struck down if they
were not justified by strong state interests unrelated to punishing or
discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.
In Maher and Hayes the Court's pendulum seems to have reversed
its swing. Deterrence criteria were abandoned and emphasis was
placed upon the question of whether any relative hardship attached to
the exercise of a right took theform ofapenaly. Thus, despite the fact
that the government policies examined in these cases resulted in significant discouragement of the assertion of rights and extreme hardship
upon citizens exercising rights, no impingement of any constitutional
right was found because there was no penalty present. Furthermore,
the Court indicated that the questioned policies in each case could be
justified solely by a purported state interest in encouraging individuals
to take the alternative course of action to exercising a right.
By emphasizing the form an unconstitutional condition takes in
relation to a right, rather than its substantive effect, and by indicating
that government may have a legitimate cognizable interest in a citizen's
not asserting a right, the Court has created the potential for permitting
great leeway for the government to create policies which have the effect
of rewarding those individuals willing to forgo disfavored constitutional rights. Yet this note urges that the same reasons that compelled
the erosion of the right-privilege distinction indicate the undesirability
of such a result. Allowing government to, in effect, buy off unpopular
rights disparages the dignity and value that constitutional rights should
have in our system of government. Furthermore, policies which will,
under the newly developed analysis, be subjected to only minimal scrutiny may foreclose rights to some individuals just as effectively as
would absolute prohibitions. To a person whose actions are tightly
governed by situational restraints, such as a criminal defendant facing
a stiff prison sentence or an indigent pregnant woman, state-offered op-
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tions like the ones in Hayes or Maher appear to offer little or no choice
at all but to surrender those rights-no matter how much free will is
apparent to someone viewing the situation from the perspective of the
Supreme Court. Laws thus tampering with the rights of citizens should
be tolerated only when justified by some pressing purpose beyond governmental dislike for the assertion of disfavored rights.
The rationale articulated in Maher and Hayes deserves to be carefully reevaluated. In these two cases the Court moves toward rejecting
a constitutional standard which addresses the substantive impact that
the conditioned grant of a privilege may have upon the exercise of a
right, and instead utilizing an amorphous test looking to form rather
than effect. In so doing the Court comes far too close to effectively
overruling the much more realistic approach to policies granting benefits in those cases where the dividing line between recipient and nonrecipient coincides with the question of whether a citizen has exercised
a constitutional right.

